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SHOULD PROSECUTORS BE REQUIRED TO
RECORD THEIR PRETRIAL INTERVIEWS WITH
ACCOMPLICES AND SNITCHES?
Sam Roberts*
INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Koubriti,1 a federal district court overturned the
convictions of the first and only defendants to be tried and convicted for
terrorist activities in the United States after the September 11, 2001
attacks. 2 The court issued its decision in response to the filing of an
"extraordinary confession of error"3-the Government's Memorandum of
Law ("Memorandum"), 4 written by a special attorney appointed by the
Department of Justice to investigate the Detroit U.S. Attorney's Office's
handling of the case.5 The Memorandum declared that the Detroit U.S.
Attorney's Office, in violation of Brady v. Maryland,6 had failed to disclose
to the defense numerous exculpatory and impeaching documents, and it set
forth in detail the Government's "pattern of mistakes and oversights that
deprived the defendants of discoverable evidence (including impeachment
material) and created a record filled with misleading inferences that such
material did not exist."'7
The only direct evidence linking the defendants to any terrorist activity
was the testimony of Yousef Hmimssa, the defendants' former roommate. 8
Hmimssa's decision to testify against his former roommates stemmed from
his own troubles with the law-Hmimssa had been arrested and convicted
in Chicago for large-scale credit card fraud, had escaped to Detroit where
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 1990, Princeton
University. Thanks to Professor Bruce Green for his excellent guidance. Thanks to my wife,
Danielia, and my parents, Jill and William Roberts, for all their love and support.
1. 336 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
2. See Bennett L. Gershman, How Juries Get It Wrong: Anatomy of the Detroit Terror
Case, 44 Washburn L.J. 327, 329 (2005).
3. Id. at 330.
4. Government's Consolidated Response Concurring in the Defendants' Motions for a
New Trial and Government's Motion to Dismiss Count One Without Prejudice and
Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof, United States v. Koubriti, 336 F. Supp. 2d 676
(E.D. Mich. 2004) (Cr. No. 01-80778) [hereinafter Memorandum], available at
http://www.freep.com/pdf/2004/09/01/Motion.pdf.
5. Koubriti, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 678.
6. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
7. Memorandum, supra note 4, at 5.
8. Id. at 7.
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he met the defendants, and was again arrested in Detroit.9 Hmimssa, who
was incarcerated at the time he began cooperating, testified that the
defendants were Islamic fundamentalists who, among other things,
conducted surveillance of potential terrorist targets in Detroit, plotted
various terrorist activities, and attempted to recruit Hmimssa to the
defendants' cause.10
After their convictions, the defendants discovered that the U.S.
Attorney's Office possessed but had not disclosed a letter written by
Hmimssa to another inmate, in which Hmimssa declared his own anti-
American sentiments, boasted about having fooled the government, and
insinuated that he (Hmimssa) had sold false identification to the September
11 hijackers. 11 The Koubriti court stated that the letter "was intentionally
not disclosed but unquestionably should have been."12 A subsequent court-
ordered government investigation into the case revealed that the Detroit
U.S. Attorney's Office had failed to disclose many documents that severely
undermined every aspect of the prosecution's case and that "the prosecution
materially misled the Court, the jury and the defense as to the nature,
character and complexion of critical evidence that provided important
foundations for the prosecution's case."13
In addition to revealing the prosecution's repeated failures to disclose
evidence, the Memorandum also addressed the problematic nature of the
prosecution's dealings with Hmimssa. Hmimssa met with Richard
Convertino, the Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") in charge of
the case, and FBI agents assisting Convertino on more than ten occasions to
discuss the testimony that Hmimssa would give at trial, and the meetings
cumulatively lasted between twenty and thirty hours. 14 During these
meetings, Convertino specifically instructed the attending FBI agent not to
take notes.15  As the Government remarked in its Memorandum,
Convertino's deliberate decision not to record the interviews with Hmimssa
prevented the defense from "determining the extent to which, if any,
[Hmimssa's] testimony changed over time." 16 The Memorandum found
that Convertino made his decision not to record the interviews "in order to
limit defense counsel's ability to cross-examine Hmimssa."' 7  Although
9. Id. at 42.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 43.
12. United States v. Koubriti, 336 F. Supp. 2d 676, 678 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
13. Id. at 681. The Detroit U.S. Attorney's Office, for example, possessed photographs
and written memoranda from government personnel from other agencies that severely
undermined the government's contention that the sketches discovered in the defendants'
apartment were drawings of the American air base in Turkey and the Jordanian military
hospital. See Memorandum, supra note 4, at 20-23, 29-36. Similarly, the government
possessed written opinions by other law enforcement agencies stating emphatically that the
video discovered in the defendants' apartment did not appear to be "casing material." Id. at
39-41.
14. Memorandum, supra note 4, at 45 n.28.
15. Id. at 45.
16. Id. at 47.
17. Id. at45.
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Convertino did not record the interviews with Hmimssa, Convertino's typed
summaries of several of the interview sessions revealed "limited but not
inconsequential discrepancies between these versions, supporting defense
counsel's claim that Hmimssa's testimony evolved over time." 18
The Government concluded that Convertino's decision not to record the
Hmimssa interviews made it difficult for the parties to determine whether
Convertino's typewritten summaries of the interviews actually contained
"all potentially disclosable statements uttered by Hmimssa." 19 As the
Memorandum implied, a recording of Convertino's interviews with
Hmimssa probably would have revealed that Hmimssa's testimony had,
indeed, evolved over time. But, as the Government also stated-in a
footnote-neither Convertino nor the agents working under his direction
were required by law to record their interviews with a government
witness.20
Should AUSA Convertino have been obliged to record his interviews
with Hmimssa? If Convertino had recorded the interviews with Hmimssa,
federal law would have required him to disclose those recordings to the
defense. 21 Like many prosecutors, Convertino chose not to record the
interviews with his key witness, precisely to avoid having to turn over to
the defense evidence that could be used to attack Hmimssa's credibility. 22
Did the fact that the prosecution developed Hmimssa's testimony over the
course of unrecorded interview sessions, in secrecy, prevent the jury from
accurately determining whether Hmimssa testified truthfully?
Prosecutors tend to rely heavily on the testimony of cooperating
witnesses, especially in cases where the prosecution has little independent
evidence to martial against the defendant. 23  Under federal law, the
18. Id. For example, Hmimssa stated in an early interview that one of the defendants
told Hmimssa that the defendant had seen "a cache of weapons from a black male in Detroit
and [that the defendant] was going to purchase [the] weapons"; in a later interview,
Hmimssa stated that the defendant told Hmimssa that he had seen "a cache of weapons from
a black Muslim male in Detroit and [that the defendant] was going to purchase and ship [the]
weapons to the GIA in Algeria." Id. at 48 n.31. Thus, details about specifically terrorist-
related activities are present in the second statement but absent from the first. See id.
19. Id. at 49. Convertino took the position that the typed summaries were attorney work
product and thus not discoverable. The court nevertheless ordered production of the
summaries for in camera review. Id. The Memorandum is unclear as to whether the court
ruled on the discoverable status of the summaries. The government did not state any
findings about whether Convertino's summaries constituted discoverable material.
20. Id. at 47 n.30.
21. See Jenks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000); Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2.
22. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 Cardozo L.
Rev. 829, 852-53 (2002) [hereinafter Witness Coaching] ("Some agents as a matter of policy
do not take notes specifically to avoid creating contradicting evidence. Some prosecutors do
not encourage note-taking, and occasionally even forbid government agents from taking
notes."); John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101 Colum. L. Rev.
1797, 1835-36 (2001) (observing that "few prosecutors even consider videotaping or tape
recording their pretrial witness interviews").
23. See George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and
Experts, 28 Pepp. L. Rev. 1, 53-54 (2000).
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testimony of an accomplice witness is sufficient to support a conviction.24
A jury's verdict often will hinge on its determination of the cooperating
witness's credibility.25 Witnesses who, like Hnimssa, testify on behalf of
the government against criminal defendants in exchange for some form of
favorable treatment have enormous incentives to testify falsely in order to
obtain leniency. 26  Rules of disclosure,27 including the mandatory
disclosure of official leniency agreements, 28 and the trial safeguard of
cross-examination 29 exist to ensure that juries correctly evaluate the
credibility of these witnesses.
Nevertheless, commentators have recognized that despite rules of
disclosure and trial safeguards, there is an inherently high risk that
cooperating witnesses will testify falsely and will be believed by juries, 30
thus resulting in convictions of the innocent. 31 Prepped at length and in
secret,32 skilled at lying,33 armed with important facts that may have been
inadvertently (or deliberately) fed to them by the prosecution, 34 cooperators
often appear highly confident and credible on the witness stand.35 Because
the cooperator's testimony is developed in secret and without
documentation, 36 his polished, incriminating account is largely unassailable
on cross-examination. 37  Lacking any knowledge of what transpired
between the prosecutor and the cooperating witness during pretrial proffer
24. See United States v. Latouf, 132 F.3d 320, 332 (6th Cir. 1997) (observing that "[t]he
testimony of an accomplice, even if uncorroborated, will suffice to support a conviction
under federal law") (internal quotation omitted).
25. See United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 335-36 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The
usefulness of an informant as a witness depends in large measure on the degree to which he
both is and can be presented to a fact finder as a reliable person.").
26. See infra Part I.E. 1.
27. See infra Part I.C.
28. See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
31. See The Innocence Project at Cardozo Sch. of Law, Causes and Remedies of
Wrongful Convictions, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/index.php (last visited June
5, 2005) (listing the testimony of informants and snitches as a major factor in sixteen of the
first seventy wrongful convictions to be overturned by the results of post-conviction DNA
testing).
32. See infra Part I.D.
33. See R. Michael Cassidy, "Soft Words of Hope": Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and
the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1129, 1140 (2004) ("Not only do
accomplice witnesses have a motive to fabricate, they have an ability to fabricate and to
fabricate convincingly.").
34. See Michael S. Ross, Thinking Outside the Box: How the Enforcement of Ethical
Rules Can Minimize the Dangers of Prosecutorial Leniency and Immunity Deals, 23
Cardozo L. Rev. 875, 884 (2002) ("[Wjhen a prosecutor tells a defendant or defense counsel
what testimony is expected of the defendant . . . in order to qualify for
cooperator/leniency/immunity status, the defendant is powerfully motivated to parrot what
the prosecution wants and expects to hear.").
35. See Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 848 (stating that the dynamics of the
preparation process allow cooperating witnesses to be "able to present [their] testimony to
the jury in a truthful and convincing manner").
36. See infra Part I.D.
37. See id.
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sessions and interviews, defense counsel has little basis from which to
cross-examine the cooperator about the process by which the government
developed the cooperator's testimony.3 8  Thus, a jury may not learn
whether the cooperating witness made inconsistent statements over the
course of the interview process, 39 whether the prosecution inadvertently (or
deliberately) fed information to the witness that made the witness's
testimony appear more credible and confident than it otherwise would have
appeared, 40 or whether the prosecution made any unrecorded threat or
inducement to the cooperator that may have motivated the witness to
testify.4 1 For many reasons, prosecutors, during their pretrial preparation of
cooperating witnesses, either fail to identify these instances when they
occur 4 2 or decide that the evidence that comes to light during the pretrial
interviews is not sufficiently exculpatory or impeaching to warrant
disclosure.43
This Note examines the process by which prosecutors develop the
testimony of cooperating witnesses and the possible dangers, identified by
legal observers, that the process presents to the truth-seeking function of
criminal trials. This Note considers whether, in light of these identified
dangers, prosecutors should be required to record their pretrial interviews
with cooperating witnesses and proposes that such a "recording rule"
should be adopted.
Part I of this Note explores how prosecutors typically develop
cooperating witness testimony in preparation for trial. Part I also examines
prosecutors' legal obligations regarding the recording of pretrial meetings
with cooperating witnesses and reviews the current regime of due process,
statutory, and professional rules that define prosecutorial disclosure
obligations. In addition, this part discusses the common prosecutorial
practice of not recording interviews with cooperators. Finally, this part
examines the reasons given by courts, commentators, and practitioners as to
why cooperators are inherently unreliable witnesses.
Part II analyzes commentators' findings about how the process by which
prosecutors develop the testimony of cooperating witnesses potentially
affects factfinders' ability to accurately assess the credibility of cooperators.
Part II also discusses these legal observers' findings about the effectiveness
of disclosure rules and cross-examination in ensuring that juries have the
opportunity to accurately evaluate the credibility of cooperating witness
testimony. In addition, this part identifies various proposals for reforming
the way in which the government uses cooperating witness testimony.
38. See id.
39. See infra Part II.A. 1.
40. See infra Part II.A.2.
41. See infra Part II.A.3.
42. See infra Part I.E.3.
43. See infra Part II.B; see generally Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence:
Avoiding the Agurs Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53
Fordham L. Rev. 391 (1984) (discussing prosecutors' pretrial application of the materiality
standard to potential Brady material).
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Lastly, Part II identifies proposals that have been advanced for the adoption
of a "recording rule," and presents several of the possible arguments that
could be made in favor of and in opposition to the adoption of such a rule.
Part LI proposes the adoption of a "recording rule," and suggests that the
rule may best be promulgated as a rule of professional conduct.
I. PROSECUTORIAL USE OF COOPERATING WITNESS TESTIMONY
This part examines the process by which prosecutors select and develop
the testimony of cooperating witnesses. Part I.A discusses the agreements
that cooperating witnesses commonly enter into with prosecutors. Part I.B
discusses whether prosecutors are legally required to record their interviews
with cooperators. Part I.C reviews the statutory, due process, and ethical
rules that govern prosecutorial disclosure obligations. Part I.D then
examines the prosecutorial practice of not recording interviews with
cooperating witnesses. Finally, Part I.E reviews the findings of courts,
commentators, and practitioners regarding the unreliability of cooperating
witness testimony.
A. Agreements Between Prosecutors and Cooperators
A cooperating witness testifies for the government, against a criminal
defendant, in the hope of obtaining some form of leniency from the
prosecution.44 Cooperating witnesses comprise accomplice witnesses and
jailhouse informants. 45 An accomplice witness is a co-participant in a
crime who agrees to testify against his alleged co-perpetrators (or
coconspirators). 46 A jailhouse informant is "an inmate who is either asked
by the government to report any incriminating evidence shared with the
inmate by another inmate or who comes forward on his or her own with
such information."47
Whether an accomplice or a jailhouse informant, the cooperating witness
provides incriminating testimony in return for some form of leniency from
the prosecution, including the dismissal of pending charges, an agreed-upon
44. See Cassidy, supra note 33, at 1134-35 (discussing how prosecutors "purchas[e]" the
testimony of cooperating witnesses with leniency).
45. See id. at 1134 (defining "cooperating witness" as an accomplice witness or a
jailhouse informant).
46. See id.; see also Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases,
45 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1992) ("In cooperation agreements the [co-]defendant trades
information and testimony, with the promise of enabling the State to make a case against
other defendants who, for one reason or another, are regarded as most deserving of the
severest form of prosecution.").
47. Jack Call, Judicial Control of Jailhouse Snitches, 22 Just. Sys. J. 73, 73 (2001); see
also Robert M. Bloom, Ratting: The Use and Abuse of Informants in the American Justice
System 63-64 (2002). Bloom identifies two types of jailhouse informants: (1) the informant
in jail, awaiting trial, who will inform on fellow prisoners in order to gain favorable plea
agreements from the prosecution; and (2) the informant in prison, who has already been
convicted and who will inform on fellow prisoners "with regard to unsolved crimes or
possible security measures internal to a prison" in exchange for possible parole
recommendations, early release, prison-related benefits or even monetary compensation. Id.
[Vol. 74
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reduced sentence, or a recommendation to the court for sentencing
leniency. 48
The interaction between a cooperating witness and the prosecution
typically consists of two stages: initially, proffer sessions and,
subsequently, the series of post-proffer interviews in which the prosecutor
prepares the witness's testimony in anticipation of trial. 49 The proffer
sessions consist usually of several meetings between the potential
cooperating witness, his attorney, government agents, and the prosecutor.50
During these meetings, the prosecutor and agents will attempt to determine
the extent to which the witness is able to provide incriminating evidence
against the defendant, typically granting the witness limited immunity in
exchange for the witness's "proffer" of information. 51 Should the
prosecutor decide that he wishes to "sign up" the cooperating witness, the
prosecutor will prepare a cooperation agreement, which normally provides
that, if the witness cooperates fully with the government and testifies
truthfully, then-after the witness has testified-the government will
extend leniency, in the form of a sentencing recommendation or charging
concession, to the witness. 52 After the witness has agreed to cooperate, the
prosecution typically conducts multiple interviews with the cooperator,
preparing and polishing the witness's testimony in anticipation of trial.53
Normally, the government will fulfill its part of the bargain only after the
witness has testified truthfully and provided the government with
"substantial assistance." 54 Whether the cooperator has testified truthfully
and has provided substantial assistance will be determined by the
prosecutor, who will typically define truthful testimony as testimony
consistent with the cooperator's proffer and as resulting in a conviction. 55
48. See Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and
Atonement, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 2 & n.1 (2003). This Note does not discuss prosecutors'
interactions with confidential informants, who often receive financial compensation in return
for their information. Because confidential informants do not usually testify at trials, the
issue of the jury's being able to fairly evaluate their credibility does not arise. For a detailed
discussion of the use of confidential informants by the government, see generally Bloom,
supra 47.
49. See Simons, supra note 48, at 15-18 (providing an overview of how federal proffer
sessions function).
50. See id.
51. See Douglass, supra note 22, at 1837.
52. See Cassidy, supra note 33, at 1146. Cassidy writes the following:
[T]he typical federal cooperation agreement provides that if the defendant
cooperates fully with the government in its investigation into criminal activity
("the investigation") and provides complete and truthful testimony whenever
called upon to do so ("the consideration") then the government will provide the
accomplice with certain sentencing or charging concessions ("the benefit").
Id.
53. See Simons, supra note 48, at 18 ("For many cooperators, however, signing the
agreement is only the beginning of a lengthy process that starts with numerous debriefing
sessions, extends to intensive witness preparation, and culminates in public testimony.").
54. See id. at 17-18 (discussing the typical conditions under which a prosecutor will
"sign up" a cooperator).
55. See Harris, supra note 23, at 17.
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Prosecutors have enormous discretionary powers in granting or withholding
recommendations for leniency.56 In recent years, the promulgation of harsh
mandatory minimum sentences and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines has
further increased the incentive of cooperating witnesses to provide the
government with testimony that incriminates the defendant. 57
B. Prosecutorial Duty to Record Witness Interviews
As was noted in the Memorandum in Koubriti, prosecutors and
government agents have no legal duty to record the statements of
government witnesses. 58  Federal and state courts have held that due
process rules and disclosure statutes do not require prosecutors and their
agents to record interviews with government witnesses.59 Although courts
have allowed for the possibility that the government's failure to record
interviews with government witnesses may violate due process if the
defendant can show that government agents acted in bad faith by
deliberately failing to record the witnesses' statements, 60 "bad faith"
exceptions have not been defined.61 Absent the defendant's showing of
56. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 393, 416 (1992)
[hereinafter New Prosecutors].
57. See id. ("The combination of the prosecutor's vast charging power coupled with
mandatory sentencing laws enables prosecutors more than ever to force persons to cooperate
with the prosecution, and to punish their failure to cooperate."); see also Ellen Yaroshefsky,
Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68
Fordham L. Rev. 917, 918-19 (1999) ("While cooperation with federal authorities is not
new, the Sentencing Guidelines have created a system with cooperation as its locus.").
58. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Brimage, 115 F.3d 73, 77-78 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that
defendants' due process rights were not violated by federal agents' failure to record an
informant's conversations with defendants in which the informant solicited defendants'
participation in a robbery, where there was no evidence indicating that the agents' decision
not to record was made in bad faith); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1288 (1st Cir.
1996) ("The Jencks Act does not impose an obligation on government agents to record
witness interviews or to take notes during such interviews."); United States v. Marashi, 913
F.2d 724, 734 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the government had no constitutional obligation
to compile Brady material by making a record of all of its interviews with the chief
prosecution witness); People v. Jackson, 474 N.E.2d 466, 474 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (observing
that there is no general requirement that all oral statements in possession or control of the
state be reduced to writing, absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the state); State v.
Crawford, 394 N.W.2d 189, 191 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the state's rules of
criminal procedure do not require that the state's agents either fully transcribe oral
statements made by witnesses or take written statements from witnesses); State v.
Hoard, 715 S.W.2d 321, 326 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) ("The state is not required to summarize
or reduce statements to writing.").
60. See, e.g., Harper v. Rowland, No. 91-56131, 1993 WL 262628, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr.
6, 1993) (noting that, while the government had no duty to record potentially exculpatory
interviews with the defendant's wife and daughter, a finding of a "bad faith failure to collect
potentially exculpatory evidence would violate the due process clause") (internal quotations
omitted).
61. See Brimage, 115 F.3d at 77 (noting that a court may probe the government's
decision not to record witness interviews for "bad faith" and allowing that "[plerhaps there
may be a case where selective recording presents a reviewing court with constitutional
concerns").
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"bad faith" on the part of the interviewer, an interview between a
prosecutor and a government witness is "presumed to have been conducted
with regularity." 62
C. Prosecutors' Differing Disclosure Obligations
A prosecutor's obligation to disclose the statements that a government
witness made during pretrial interviews differs depending upon whether the
prosecutor recorded or did not record the interviews. When prosecutors
record interviews with a witness, through transcription, audiotape, or
videotape, federal and state laws require that the recordings be disclosed to
the defense.63 When prosecutors do not record the witness interviews,
prosecutors are required to disclose only those statements that are
materially exculpatory of the defendant or impeaching of the government's
witnesses. 64
1. Prosecutorial Obligations when Interviews Are Recorded
When prosecutors record interviews with witnesses, federal and state
laws require that the recordings be disclosed to the defense. In the federal
sphere, the Jencks Act 65 requires that the prosecution disclose to the
defense at trial all pretrial statements of government witnesses, after the
witnesses have testified on direct examination, 66 where "statements" are
defined as:
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by him;
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a
transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral
statement made by said witness and recorded contemporaneously with the
making of such oral statement; or
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof,
if any, made by said witness to a grand jury.67
Thus, the Jencks Act does not require the government to disclose a
witness's oral statements. Additionally, a prosecutor's or government
agent's written notes summarizing the statements of a government witness
are not discoverable under the Jencks Act, even if the notes contain
62. Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1289 (internal quotation omitted).
63. See infra Part I.C.1.
64. See infra Part I.C.2.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2.
66. Although § 3500 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2 require that the
government disclose a prosecution witness's statements to the defense only after that witness
has testified on direct examination, "practice demonstrates that most prosecutors presently
exceed the restrictiveness of the statute and rule" and often disclose Jencks Act material
prior to trial. Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Discover) of Jencks Witness Statements: Timing
Makes a Difference, 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 651, 656 (1999).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e).
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verbatim words and phrases used by the witness during the interview.68
Thus, prosecutors and agents who avoid the verbatim recording of witness
statements may nevertheless document those statements in summarized
form, without triggering the Jencks Act.6 9
State discovery statutes may, like the Jencks Act, require the government
to disclose only substantially verbatim recordings of witness statements and
not require the disclosure of summaries of witnesses' statements, 70 or state
laws may require the government to provide the defense with any written
summaries of witnesses' statements, in addition to substantially verbatim
recordings of witness statements. 71
2. Prosecutorial Obligations when Interviews Are Not Recorded
When prosecutors do not record their interviews with government
witnesses (or, as noted above, when prosecutors merely take notes
summarizing the interviews), 72 the prosecutorial disclosure duty is
governed by the due process jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court and
by rules of professional conduct.73 In contrast to a recorded interview,
which leaves the prosecutor with no discretion in deciding which statements
of the witness he should disclose,74 an unrecorded interview requires that
the prosecutor determine which of the witness's statements, if any, are
sufficiently exculpatory or impeaching to warrant disclosure under due
process and ethical disclosure rules.75
68. See, e.g., United States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097, 1105 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that
prosecutor's notes from an interview with government a witness did not qualify as Jencks
Act material, where the notes "reflect[ed] the prosecutor's reactions to the witness," even
though the notes "occasionally reflect[ed] precise phrases used by the witness").
69. See Panel Discussion, Criminal Discovery in Practice, 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 781,
786-87 (1999) [hereinafter Panel Discussion] (remarks of Assistant United States Attorney
("AUSA") G. Doug Jones) (discussing the common practice among prosecutors and
government agents of summarizing, rather than recording, witness statements to avoid
triggering Jencks Act disclosure requirements). But see United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F.
Supp. 2d 1196 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that the government must disclose to the defense,
prior to trial, all summaries of pretrial statements made by a cooperating witness).
70. See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. Proc. § 240.45(1)(a) (McKinney 2000) (requiring that the
People disclose to the defense "[a]ny written or recorded statement ... made by a person
whom the prosecutor intends to call as a witness at trial, and which relates to the subject
matter of the witness's testimony").
71. See, e.g., Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01(1)(a) ("The prosecuting attorney shall permit
defense counsel to inspect and reproduce [the government] witnesses' relevant written or
recorded statements and any written summaries within the prosecuting attorney's knowledge
of the substance of relevant oral statements made by such witnesses to prosecution agents.");
see also David Aaron, Note, Ethics, Law Enforcement, and Fair Dealing: A Prosecutor's
Duty to Disclose Nonevidentiary Information, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 3005, 3020 (1999)
(noting that state rules may impose broader disclosure requirements upon prosecutors than
those imposed by the Jencks Act).
72. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
73. See generally Lisa M. Kurcias, Note, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory
Evidence, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1205 (2000).
74. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
75. See Capra, supra note 43, at 394-95.
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a. Due Process Disclosure Rules
The Supreme Court held, in Brady v. Maryland,76 that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a prosecutor to disclose to
the defense any evidence that is "favorable" to the defendant and that is
"material either to guilt or to punishment. ' 77 Suppression of such evidence
violates due process, regardless of the good or bad faith of the
prosecution. 78 "Favorable" evidence includes evidence that impeaches the
credibility of a government witness.79 A prosecutor who fails to correct the
testimony of a government witness that he knows to be false also violates
due process, even if the testimony relates only to the witness's credibility. 80
A prosecutor must also disclose to the defense any material evidence that is
impeaching of a government witness, including leniency agreements made
between the government and cooperating witnesses. 81 The disclosure of
such agreements is intended to "enable[] the jury to assess fully and
accurately the credibility of the witness, and, derivatively, the guilt or
innocence of the accused. '82
In addition, the prosecution has an affirmative duty to learn of and
disclose exculpatory information possessed by government personnel who
assist the prosecutor, including police officers and other investigators.83
Due process requires that the prosecution disclose material evidence even
when the defense has not specifically requested disclosure of that
evidence. 84 Evidence is considered to be material to the accused if there is
a "reasonable probability" that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the defendant's trial would have been different.85 The
constitutional rule announced in Brady does not distinguish between oral
and written statements. 86 Thus, regardless of whether a prosecutor or agent
chooses to record the pretrial statements of a cooperating witness, due
process rules require the prosecutor to disclose materially favorable
evidence to the defense. 87
76. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
77. Id. at 87.
78. Id.
79. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
80. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959).
81. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
82. Cassidy, supra note 33, at 1131.
83. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437 (1995).
84. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
85. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (internal quotation omitted).
86. See United States v. Joseph 533 F.2d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 1976) (noting that "[i]t
would be incongruous to hold that an oral agreement falls outside the scope of Brady, a
written agreement within"); see also Savage v. State, 600 So. 2d 405, 408 (Ala. Crim. App.
1992) (holding that the prosecution violated Brady, where police had knowledge of oral
statements of two witnesses who stated that the defendant had acted in self-defense and
police failed to disclose the statements to the defense, police knowledge of the statements
was imputed to the prosecutor).
87. Joseph, 533 F.2d at 286.
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b. Ethical Disclosure Rules
Prosecutorial disclosure duties are also governed by rules of professional
conduct. Rule 3.8(d) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct-entitled
"Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor"-states that a prosecutor must
"make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense." 88  Every state has ethical rules governing
prosecutorial disclosure, similar to Rule 3.8(d) of the Model Rules. 89 The
prosecutorial disclosure duty set forth in Model Rule 3.8(d) has a slightly
broader reach than the due process disclosure requirements established by
Brady and its progeny, in that the Model Rules do not include an explicit
materiality requirement. 90 The Model Rules' disclosure duty, however,
also can be construed as narrower than the constitutional requirements, in
that the Model Rules do not hold a prosecutor accountable for a failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence that is in the possession of law enforcement
agents who are assisting the prosecutor. 9 1 Commentators have remarked,
however, that in practice, Model Rule 3.8(d) operates almost identically to
the disclosure doctrine set forth in the Brady line of cases.92
D. Prosecutorial Practice of Not Recording Witness Interviews
Legal commentators have recognized that prosecutors and their agents-
as a matter of policy-frequently do not record their interviews with
88. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.8(d) (2003); see also Model Code of Prof'l
Responsibility DR 7-103(B) (1983) ("A public prosecutor ... shall make timely disclosure
[to the defense] ... of the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or other
government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused ...."); Standards Relating
to the Admin. of Criminal Justice § 3-3.11 (a) ("A prosecutor should not intentionally fail to
make timely disclosure to the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of the existence of
all evidence or information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused ....").
89. See Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of
the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 833,
879 (1997).
90. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1573,
1592-93 (2003) [hereinafter Green, Prosecutorial Ethics] (observing that "[t]o a small
degree, the [Model Rules'] provision imposes an additional disclosure obligation, in that it
requires disclosure of any exculpatory evidence whereas the constitutional case law requires
exculpatory evidence to be produced only when it is 'material' to the defense") (citation
omitted); Kevin C. McMunigal, Are Prosecutorial Ethics Standards Different?, 68 Fordham
L. Rev. 1453, 1465 (2000) (noting that Model Rule 3.8(d) is broader than the due process
disclosure requirement because the Model Rule "has no materiality restriction and is not
limited to admissible evidence").
91. See Michael E. Gardner, Note, An Affair to Remember: Further Refinement of the
Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence: State v. White, 68 Mo. L. Rev. 469,
475 (2003).
92. See Green, Prosecutorial Ethics, supra note 90, at 1592-93 (noting that the
disclosure duty in the Model Rules "is already imposed in large part by the Due Process
Clause" and that "as far as one can tell, courts do not invoke the disciplinary rule as a source
of additional disclosure obligations, and courts and disciplinary authorities do not sanction
prosecutors for failing to disclose evidence as required by the rule but not by other law").
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cooperating witnesses.93 Although police and investigators may take notes
of meetings with cooperating witnesses in the investigative stages of a case,
prosecutors often discourage the creation of any official report that
documents the witnesses' statements. 94 As a result, because prosecutors are
not automatically required to disclose witnesses' oral statements, 95 "it is
common for prosecutors to spend dozens of pretrial hours with cooperating
witnesses without creating one word of discoverable material."'96
A Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") agent's frank discussion of his
policy not to record interviews and the motivation behind that policy were
recounted by the court in United States v. Bernard:97
[I]n trying to avoid [disclosing] contradicting facts from the interview of
any defendant or any informant, it is my policy not to write down
anything until I am sure the defendant or informant knows exactly what
he is saying.... That is to prevent any problems of getting into court and
having contradictions from for instance an interview in March with an
interview in July, with an interview in August, with an interview in
September, and having the defense counsel come back and say "Well, did
you say this differently at this time?" That is the purpose of my not taking
notes. 98
A series of interviews that Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky conducted with
former and current federal prosecutors reveal that many prosecutors act
similarly to the agent quoted in Bernard.99  As one former AUSA
remarked, "While there is no office policy of not taking notes, the office
lore is don't take too many notes or figure out how to take notes so that they
are meaningful to you and no one else. You do not want a complete set of
materials that you have to disclose."' 00
E. Recognized Dangers of Cooperating Witness Testimony
Courts have acknowledged that cooperating witnesses are "inherently
untrustworthy." 101 The Supreme Court "has long recognized the serious
questions of credibility [cooperators] pose."'1 2  Commentators have
recognized widely that the government's use of such testimony is "rife with
93. See, e.g., Douglass, supra note 22, at 1835-36 (remarking that "few prosecutors even
consider videotaping or tape recording their pretrial witness interviews"); Witness Coaching,
supra note 22, at 852-53 ("Some agents as a matter of policy do not take notes specifically to
avoid creating contradicting evidence. Some prosecutors do not encourage note-taking, and
occasionally even forbid government agents from taking notes.").
94. See Douglass, supra note 22, at 1836.
95. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
96. Douglass, supra note 22, at 1836.
97. 625 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1980).
98. Id. at 859.
99. See generally Yaroshefsky, supra note 57, passim (recounting interviews with
AUSAs about their interactions with cooperating witnesses).
100. Id. at 961 (citations and quotations omitted); see also Witness Coaching, supra note
22, at 853 ("Prosecutors and their agents typically do not prepare extensive notes, and when
they do take notes, they try to do it in a safe way that avoids disclosure.").
101. Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 479 (9th Cir. 1997).
102. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 701 (2004) (internal quotation omitted).
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the potential for abuse."' 103  The cooperating witness's tender of
incriminating information in exchange for some form of leniency has been
called "the disease that threatens the integrity of all accomplice
information." 104  As one writer has stated, "It is accepted by almost
everyone who participates as a professional in the workings of the criminal
justice system-prosecutors, defense attorneys, law enforcement agents,
and judges-that the use of cooperating witnesses in obtaining convictions
is laden with risks." 10 5  The government's use of cooperating witness
testimony, "where the prosecution controls the selection, preparation and
compensation of cooperating witnesses, poses a significant risk of wrongful
conviction, especially when combined with other risk factors." 10 6
Commentators point to studies of wrongful conviction 10 7 that show that
false testimony by cooperating witnesses is a leading cause of wrongful
convictions. 10 8 Legal observers have identified a number of factors that
lead to the potential that cooperating witnesses may testify falsely.
1. Cooperators' Incentive to Fabricate Testimony
The danger that a cooperating witness will testify falsely derives
primarily from the fact that no witness in a criminal trial, apart from the
defendant, has a greater incentive to lie than does the cooperating
witness.10 9 As one judge has remarked, "Criminals are likely to say and do
almost anything to get what they want, especially when what they want is to
get out of trouble with the law." 110
Legal observers have noted that, even before negotiations begin with the
government, an accomplice witness has a great incentive to fabricate
statements in order to shift blame away from himself and his allies and
103. Cassidy, supra note 33, at 1130.
104. Douglass, supra note 22, at 1829.
105. Steven M. Cohen, What Is True? Perspectives of a Former Prosecutor, 23 Cardozo
L. Rev. 817, 827 (2002).
106. Harris, supra note 23, at 58.
107. See, e.g., The Innocence Project at Cardozo Sch. of Law, Causes and Remedies of
Wrongful Convictions, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/index.php (last visited June
5, 2005) (listing the testimony of informants and snitches as a major factor in sixteen of the
first seventy wrongful convictions to be overturned by the results of post-conviction DNA
testing).
108. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 23, at 57 (citing a 1987 study by Hugo Adam Bedau and
Michael L. Radelet of 350 cases of erroneous convictions in potentially capital cases which
found the leading cause, contributing to error in a third of those cases (117 cases total), to be
"perjury by prosecution witness," and that at least thirty-five of the 117 cases studied
involved the testimony of a cooperating witness who was receiving some form of leniency
from the prosecution (internal quotations omitted)); C. Ronald Huff, Wrongful Convictions:
Causes and Public Policy Issues, Crim. Just., Spring 2003, at 15, 18 (noting that "five of the
first 13 Illinois death row inmates found to have been wrongfully convicted were prosecuted
using jailhouse informants" and that "[miany DNA exoneration cases have revealed that the
initial convictions involved the use of 'jailhouse snitches.').
109. See Cohen, supra note 105, at 827; Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 847.
110. Hon. Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as
Witnesses, 47 Hastings L.J. 1381, 1383 (1996).
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implicate someone else. II1 Once the would-be cooperator understands that
he may receive leniency in exchange for testimony, his incentive to lie
dramatically increases.112  Because the cooperator knows that the
government will not extend leniency unless the cooperator provides
testimony that helps the government make its case,11 3 the cooperator is
driven to tell the prosecutor whatever the witness believes the prosecutor
wants to hear.114 The use of cooperating witness testimony creates the
potential "danger that the details provided by the witness will be tailored to
conform to the prosecutor's expectations." '1 5 In the hope of obtaining a
favorable plea agreement, a reduction in sentence, or possibly the dismissal
of charges as a possible result of cooperation, a cooperating witness often
will promise "to testify to whatever facts will help the prosecution's case,
truthful or not."'1 16
2. Cooperators' Ability to Fabricate Testimony
As Michael Cassidy has noted, not only do cooperating witnesses have a
strong motive to provide false testimony in order to obtain leniency, such
witnesses often have the ability to lie convincingly to prosecutors. 117 Lies
are usually very subtle and therefore hard to detect because the lies "often
relate to the minutiae of a case, and concern facts that are not readily
discoverable or easily disproved." 118 A witness who assisted in a murder
might admit to being present at the murder, for example, but lie about who
fired the gun. 119 Prosecutors and their agents may have difficulty in
detecting fabrications because cooperating witnesses often "are immersed
in the details of the crime and know which aspects of the enterprise are
verifiable and which are not."120 Thus, prosecutors and their agents may
believe a cooperating witness simply because the prosecutor or agent is able
111. See Cohen, supra note 105, at 822 (stating that "prosecutors assume.., that
defendants tend to minimize their role in and responsibility for criminal conduct, and that
they tend to exculpate friends and allies and implicate rivals and adversaries"); see also
Hughes, supra note 46, at 35 ("Accomplices, if they give information or testify, may have a
natural tendency to lie in order to minimize their part in the crime.").
112. See Hughes, supra note 46, at 27.
113. See Harris, supra note 23, at 50 ("Every defendant or target of an investigation
knows that her only possibility of making a deal with the government for lenient treatment is
a proffer of testimony helpful in convicting another defendant or target.").
114. See Cassidy, supra note 33, at 1140 ("Accomplice witnesses are very eager to please
the government, precisely because they perceive that their future liberty and safety depend
on it."); see also Ross, supra note 34, at 879 (stating that "one fact is undeniable: the
incentive [for cooperating witnesses] to lie is so powerful, that some witnesses will lie").
115. Hon. John Gleeson, Supervising Criminal Investigations: The Proper Scope of the
Supervisory Power of Federal Judges, 5 J.L. & Pol'y 423, 457 (1997).
116. Ross, supra note 34, at 879 (internal quotations omitted).
117. Cassidy, supra note 33, at 1140.
118. Cohen, supra note 105, at 825.
119. See id. ("[Tihe lie might concern not whether someone participated in a murder, but
who was the shooter in the murder, or who gave the order to commit the murder, or who
provided the guns.").
120. Cassidy, supra note 33, at 1140.
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to corroborate many of the details about the crimes that the witness
provides during pretrial interview sessions. 121
Similarly, even when cooperators are not familiar with independent
evidence of a crime (as is often the case with jailhouse informants), such
witnesses may be skilled at learning details about the case or about what
information the government wants to hear. Cooperators often enter into
negotiations with prosecutors already fully equipped with false information
that they have obtained from other sources-such as newspaper accounts,
other inmates, friends, family members, or even their own attorneys.
1 22
Leslie Vernon White, for example, an infamous California informant, while
in jail routinely telephoned courthouse sources, identified himself as a
prosecutor, and obtained information not known to the press or public
which he would then present to the government in proffer sessions.1 23 In
Spicer v. Roxbury Correctional Institute,124  Brown-an inmate who
wanted a plea deal-told his own lawyer that he had heard the defendant
speak about planning a robbery but was not an eyewitness to the crime.
1 25
Brown's lawyer approached the District Attorney ("D.A.") with this
information and was told by the D.A. that Brown's statements were not
sufficiently incriminating of the defendant to induce the D.A. to offer
Brown a deal. 126 Defense counsel relayed the D.A. comments to Brown.
1 27
Brown later met with the D.A. without his lawyer and told the D.A. that he
121. Id. at 1164-65; see also C. Blaine Elliott, Life's Uncertainties: How to Deal with
Cooperating Witnesses and Jailhouse Snitches, 16 Cap. Def. J. 1, 16 (2003) ("Many
prosecutors believe snitches because the information they provided was consistent with other
information already gathered.").
122. See Douglass, supra note 22, at 1838. Douglass writes the following:
In the days awaiting his trial testimony, the cooperator is likely to be exposed to
case related details from a variety of sources other than prosecutors and police. He
may learn helpful details through news accounts, family visits, conferences with
his own counsel, and, of course, the always active jailhouse "grapevine." All of
these sources can assist the cooperator to tailor details of his trial testimony to
coincide with other evidence in the case.
Id.
123. See Robert M. Bloom, Jailhouse Informants, Crim. Just., Spring 2003, at 20, 22
(describing White's success at obtaining information that allowed him to appear credible to
prosecutors). Jack Call describes White's simple, highly successful methods:
Given only the last name of a murder suspect with whom White had no known
prior association and who was being detained in the jail awaiting trial, White used
a jail phone that was provided to inmates to call lawyers, family members, and
friends to obtain a wealth of data about the suspect. The data White obtained was
sufficient to convince law enforcement authorities that White could have received
it only from conversations with the suspect and not from newspaper accounts of
the suspect's crime. White was also able to arrange for the suspect and him to be
transported to a courthouse on the same day, so he could prove that he had been in
physical contact with the suspect. White indicated that using these techniques, he
had obtained information and given false testimony in twelve cases.
Call, supra note 47, at 74.
124. 194 F.3d 547 (4th Cir. 1999).
125. Id. at 551.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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saw the defendant running from the crime scene.1 28 Brown subsequently
got his deal. 129  Thus, even before beginning negotiations with the
government, cooperators can learn information that makes them appear
credible and/or valuable to the prosecution, even though they have no
personal knowledge of the information.
3. Cooperators' Ability to Learn Information Through Pretrial Interviews
Although "some prosecutors coach witnesses with the deliberate
objective of promoting false or misleading testimony," 130 even the best-
intentioned prosecutor or agent may unwittingly alert the witness to what
the prosecution wants the witness to say.' 3 1 For example, a prosecutor may
inadvertently ask a leading question, express satisfaction or disappointment
in the witness's response to a question, or reveal a fact about the case to the
witness-each instance of which may allow the cooperating witness to fill
gaps in his statements, alter testimony that does not conform to other
evidence in the case, or otherwise conform his statements to what the
cooperator perceives to be the prosecution's theory of the case. 132 Even the
mere act of displaying to the cooperator an exhibit that he will have to
identify at trial can cause the witness to provide "more self-assured and
detailed" trial testimony.' 3 3  The act of "feeding" information to the
cooperator may be entirely inadvertent. As one writer has remarked,
"Many prosecutors appear to be unaware of the extent to which they
express verbally or non-verbally a genuine interest in certain facts, or
communicate disappointment when the witness does not know particular
facts, and thereby tip off the witness to what they want him to say."'134
By feeding the witness details about the case, however inadvertently,
prosecutors and agents may become the source of the information that
allows the cooperator to appear credible in interview sessions and,
eventually, at trial. 135 Professor John Douglass has stated that, even if
prosecutors and agents are very careful to avoid feeding extrinsic
information about the case or their expectations to a witness, the nature of
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 833.
131. See, e.g., Trott, supra note 110, at 1403-04.
132. See Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 834 (stating that, during interviews,
prosecutors have "the ability, consciously or unconsciously, to strengthen the case by
questions and suggestions that cause the witness to fill gaps in memory, eliminate
ambiguities or contradictions, sharpen language, create emphasis, and alter demeanor"); see
also J. Alexander Tanford, The Ethics of Evidence, 25 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 487, 537 (2002)
("Indeed, psychologists have shown that the very act of interviewing will produce distorted
and inaccurate testimony.").
133. Douglass, supra note 22, at 1837 n.174.
134. Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 843; see also Richard Wydick, The Ethics of
Witness Coaching, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 9-12 (1995) (discussing how witness interviewing
by even a well-intentioned lawyer can result in the "tainting" of witness testimony without
the lawyer's knowledge).
135. See Trott, supra note 110, at 1404.
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the interview process-and the alertness of the cooperator to "clues"-
makes "the danger of tailoring testimony.., almost unavoidable. It is
exceedingly difficult to discuss a case with a potential witness without
exposing information that will assist the witness in avoiding an
impeachable contradiction at trial."'1 36
The chance that a cooperating witness will tailor testimony to fit the
prosecutor's expectations is greatest during the proffer session, during
which the prosecutor is likely to inform a potential witness about what
testimony the prosecution will require in exchange for leniency. 137
Prosecutors and agents may tell a witness that he must "do better"-that is,
come up with more incriminating or useful information-in order to be
signed up as a cooperator. The cooperator may then respond by fabricating
the improved evidence. 138 Ellen Yaroshefsky, in an article collecting the
experiences of a number of federal prosecutors regarding their dealings
with cooperating witnesses, cites one AUSA's example of a "symptomatic"
proffer session during which a cooperating witness takes his cue from the
prosecutor's loaded question:
During the proffer session, it is clear that the agent believes that five
people, including Jones, were present at a meeting to discuss distribution
of drugs. The agent asks the cooperator:
Who was present at the meeting. The cooperator mentions some names
but does not include Jones.
Was anyone else there? The cooperator says no.
Are you telling me that Jones was not there?
At that juncture, the cooperator knows what the agent wants to hear. 13 9
In this type of situation, the prosecutor has "ultimately... convey[ed] to
the witness the prosecutor's expectations and the witness eventually will get
the message and say it.1'14°
4. Prosecutorial Ability to Detect Fabrications
In many cases where prosecutors use the testimony of cooperating
witnesses, there is little independent evidence to prove the defendant's
136. Douglass, supra note 22, at 1837.
137. See Ross, supra note 34, at 884. Ross writes that
when a prosecutor tells a defendant or defense counsel what testimony is expected
of the defendant (either in detail or in the form of bullet points) in order to qualify
for cooperator/leniency/immunity status, the defendant is powerfully motivated to
parrot what the prosecution wants and expects to hear. Similarly, if the defendant
or his or her counsel provides a proffer of facts, which is then followed by the
prosecutor announcing that those facts are insufficient or inaccurate, again the
cooperating witness is powerfully motivated to "change the story" to
accommodate the prosecutor's version of the truth.
Id.
138. See Trott, supra note 110, at 1404.
139. Yaroshefsky, supra note 57, at 959.
140. Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 843.
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guilt.14 1  In these cases, the prosecutor must rely largely on his "gut
reaction" to determine whether the cooperator is telling the truth. 142
Prosecutors may trust their gut reaction and firmly believe that they can tell,
in the end, which portion of the witness's account is a lie and which portion
is true. 143 As former prosecutors have recognized, that "gut reaction" is
often wrong, and, indeed, prosecutors are often "horrible" at assessing the
credibility of their cooperators. 144  For example, a former prosecutor
described a case in which the government had little independent evidence
of the crime that was being prosecuted. 145 A cooperating witness knew that
his extensive criminal record made him less valuable to the prosecution and
that, in order to receive favorable treatment, he would have to supply the
prosecution with substantial information. 146 The witness therefore invented
a series of crimes in which he and others had participated. 147  The
prosecutor and his colleagues believed the witness, because they did not
imagine that a witness would tell lies that inculpated himself in criminal
activity. 148
In addition, a prosecutor may be unable to accurately assess the
credibility of cooperators because the prosecutor develops an inordinate
amount of trust in the cooperating witness and will believe the witness's
account, even about facts that the prosecutor is not able to corroborate. 149
Prosecutors commonly develop affection for their informants. 150 As one
former AUSA has remarked, "The incentives to please you are great and
you might not even recognize them because you have come to develop what
you believe to be a trusting relationship with your cooperator. It is not that
he thinks he's fabricating information. He's just eager to please." 151 The
tendency to "fall[] in love with your rat," deprives prosecutors of the ability
to scrutinize the cooperator's account with the objectivity necessary to
determine if the witness may be lying. ' 5 2
Finally, as a number of legal writers have remarked, a prosecutor's
difficulty in assessing a cooperating witness's credibility with accuracy
141. See Cohen, supra note 105, at 822.
142. See id.
143. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 57, at 962 (recounting a prosecutor's comment that, in
interviewing cooperating witnesses, "[y]ou know the truth and your job in those sessions is
to get the cooperator there").
144. Id. at 953; see also Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 848.
145. Cohen, supra note 105, at 824.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Cassidy, supra note 33, at 1140-41.
150. See Joel Cohen, When Prosecutors Prepare Cooperators, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 865,
867 (2002) (describing how New York state and federal prosecutors, during the pretrial
proffer and interview process, became "buddies" with Robert Leuci, a corrupt New York
City detective who provided testimony against his equally corrupt fellow detectives); see
also Trott, supra note 110, at 1396-97 (admonishing prosecutors not to become too friendly
with or trusting of cooperating witnesses).
151. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 57, at 943.
152. Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 849.
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may derive from the fact that the prosecutor wants to believe the
cooperator. 153  A cooperating witness provides "the most damaging
evidence against a defendant, is capable of lying convincingly, and
typically is believed by the jury."'154 In developing evidence to support a
charge, even well-intentioned prosecutors tend to assess the evidence from
the point of view of a zealous advocate, rather than objectively. 155 As
naturally biased advocates, prosecutors will ignore or downplay signs that
the cooperator may be making false statements, such as inconsistencies or
gaps in the cooperator's account, and opt instead to believe the portions of
the witness's account that support the prosecution's theory of guilt. 56 As
one former AUSA has said, "Prosecutors are convinced they have the guilty
guy, then they go about seeking to convict and do not carefully look at
things that are funny about their case." 157  Even well-intentioned
prosecutors, who have what they believe to be conclusive evidence of a
defendant's guilt, may ignore inconsistencies in a cooperating witness's
account in order to serve a "higher justice."'158 Because prosecutors,
functioning within the adversarial system, tend to act as zealous advocates
and because prosecutors are usually under great institutional pressure to
seek convictions, the prosecutor's primary goal is to obtain a conviction. 159
Because prosecutors tend to be conviction driven, "it is far too easy [for
prosecutors] to take the accounts given by cooperators at face value when,
for a variety of reasons, they neatly fit into the prosecutor's preconceived
view of the evidence, or are precisely what the prosecutor wants to hear."' 60
153. See, e.g., id. at 848 ("A prosecutor has a powerful incentive to accept a cooperator's
account uncritically.").
154. Id. at 847.
155. See Capra, supra note 43, at 424.
156. See Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 848 (explaining that prosecutors "may have
a theory of the case that they developed from other evidence or from reliance on the opinion
of the case agent. These prosecutors believe that theory to be true, and to the extent that the
cooperator's version is inconsistent with this theory, the prosecutor may conclude that the
cooperator is lying or withholding information"); see also Capra, supra note 43, at 394-95.
157. Yaroshefsky, supra note 57, at 945. Other prosecutors had similar comments, such
as: "Prosecutors are, nevertheless, advocates. They get wedded to their theory and things
inconsistent with their theory are ignored"; and "[i]f you only have a hammer, everything
looks like a nail." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
158. Weeks, supra note 89, at 834-35.
159. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 125, 182 (2004) ("[T]he institutional culture of most
prosecutors' offices treasures convictions, and an attorney's conviction rate may serve as a
barometer of that person's stature within the organization and a key factor in determining
that person's chances for internal advancement."). See generally Ross, supra note 34; Abbe
Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 355
(2001).
160. Cohen, supra note 150, at 869.
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II. THE EFFECT OF PRETRIAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN
PROSECUTORS AND COOPERATORS ON THE TRUTH-SEEKING
FUNCTION OF TRIALS: CALLS FOR REFORM
Commentators have argued that the pretrial process by which prosecutors
interact with cooperating witnesses prevents juries from learning about the
existence of important evidence that often arises during these interactions
and that the jury needs in order to accurately evaluate the credibility of the
cooperator. These commentators also contend that current disclosure rules
and trial safeguards are not sufficient to ensure that juries have the
opportunity to accurately evaluate the cooperator's credibility. This Part
examines these arguments. This Part also discusses proposals, advanced by
legal writers, for greater transparency in pretrial interactions between
prosecutors and cooperators, including the proposal for a rule requiring the
recording of all pretrial meetings between prosecutors and cooperators.
Finally, this Part identifies several arguments that could be made both in
favor of and in opposition to the adoption of a recording rule.
A. Evidence Arising During Pretrial Meetings
In United States v. Sudikoff,161 the federal district court stated that,
during the government's pretrial interviews with cooperating witnesses,
evidence of the cooperator's inconsistent statements1 62 and evidence of the
cooperator's bias 163 was likely to be developed. Accordingly, the court
held that all of the government's notes or summaries of statements made by
a cooperating witness during pretrial interviews must be disclosed to the
defense, even though those statements were not "substantially verbatim
recitals"'164 and thus did not qualify as Jencks material. 165 In addition to
evidence of inconsistent statements and witness bias, commentators have
161. 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
162. See id. at 1202. The court stated as follows:
Because [the pretrial interview] process can be lengthy and because it often carries
some of the typical negotiating give-and-take, it is possible, maybe even likely,
that the witness's proposed testimony that was proffered at the beginning of the
process differed in some respects from the testimony proffered at the end of the
process.
Id. at 1202.
163. See id. at 1203 ("[lInformation that reveals the process by which an accomplice
witness and the government reach a leniency agreement is relevant to the witness's
credibility because it reveals the witness's motive to testify against the defendant.").
164. Id. at 1204 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000)).
165. Id. at 1206. In Sudikoff, the government conducted extensive proffer sessions, over
a period of several months, with the co-defendants' accomplice in a securities fraud scheme.
Id. at 1197. The government granted immunity to the accomplice in exchange for his
testimony. Id. The defendants moved, prior to trial, for complete discovery of all statements
made by the accomplice witness during his meetings with the prosecution and for all of the
government's notes and memoranda of those meetings. Id. The court granted the motion,
holding that the inherent bias of a cooperating witness and the likelihood that the witness
gave inconsistent statements over the course of the interviews warranted a presumption that
all evidence relating to the witness's interviews with the government was discoverable under
Brady and Giglio. Id. at 1202-04.
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noted that pretrial meetings between prosecutors and cooperators may also
contain evidence that the cooperating witness constructed his story based on
information that was deliberately or accidentally supplied to the witness by
prosecutors during the course of the interview process. 166 This section
addresses the three different types of potentially disclosable evidence-
inconsistent statements, prosecutorial threats or inducements apart from
official leniency agreements, and evidence of prosecutorial contamination
of the witness interview process-that may arise during the prosecutions'
pretrial interactions with cooperating witnesses.
1. Inconsistent Statements
Inconsistencies in a witness's pretrial statements arise naturally during
the pretrial interviewing process, and practitioners assert that it is part of a
lawyer's job to prepare the witness so that opposing counsel cannot detect
those inconsistencies and reveal them on cross-examination. 167 Unlike
most other witnesses, however, cooperating witnesses have an extremely
strong incentive to lie,168 and, as one court has recognized, inconsistencies
in cooperators' pretrial statements are more likely to "stem from the
accomplice witness's tendency to embroider on the truth" rather than from
the nature of the interview process. 169
The process by which prosecutors debrief the cooperating witness during
proffer sessions and then prepare the witness to testify at trial is typically
lengthy, measured in multiple interviews that occur over many weeks, if not
months. 170 As happened with Convertino's pretrial interviews of Hmimssa
in the Koubriti case, 171 the statements of a cooperating witness tend to
change during this period of time, as the interview process "smooth[s] out
gaps and contradictions" in the witness's account of events. 172 One writer
has remarked that the following observation, made by a defense lawyer,
presents no exaggeration: "The Government has a room at the Marriott
Hotel in which witnesses are transmogrified. I wish I had a room where I
could do that to people."'173 Prosecutors remark that it is common,
particularly at the outset of the proffer process, for cooperating witnesses to
lie in order to "feel out" the prosecution to determine how the witnesses can
best negotiate a favorable plea deal. 174  The cooperating witness's
166. See infra Part II.A.3.
167. See Nicole LeGrande & Kathleen E. Mierau, Note, Witness Preparation and the
Trial Consulting Industry, 17 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 947 (2004) (discussing the practice of
witness coaching). See generally Wydick, supra note 134 (same).
168. See supra Part I.E. 1.
169. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1202.
170. See Douglass, supra note 22, at 1837 n.173 ("[W]ith key cooperating witnesses in
major cases, prosecutorial polishing of cooperators may be measured in weeks or months.").
171. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
172. Douglass, supra note 22, at 1842.
173. Id. at 1833-34 (internal quotations omitted).
174. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 57, at 961-62; see also Trott, supra note 110, at 1403-
04 (discussing how witnesses lie in early proffer sessions, particularly in order to attempt to
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subsequent statements usually will prove to be partially or wholly
inconsistent with the statements that the witness made in early proffer
sessions. 175  Prosecutors and their agents are aware that cooperating
witnesses make inconsistent statements during pretrial interviews and,
accordingly, choose not to record the interviews precisely in order to avoid
having to disclose those inconsistent statements. 176
2. Unrecorded Threats and Inducements
Constitutional due process, as set forth in Giglio v. United States,177
requires that the prosecution disclose to the defense any on-the-record
promise or agreement that the prosecution has made with the cooperating
witness in exchange for the witness's testimony.' 78 In the absence of an
official (written) agreement, the prosecution is not required to disclose
unofficial (oral) statements that a prosecutor or government agent made to
the cooperator, indicating that the cooperator would receive some benefit
for his testimony. 179 Thus, if the prosecutor, without doing more, tells the
witness that the government will "take care of' the witness at sentencing, or
if the prosecutor tells the witness that his testimony will be "taken into
consideration," those oral statements do not have to be disclosed.' 80
Professor Michael Cassidy has written that such implied leniency
agreements are commonplace, 18' and are usually sufficient to motivate the
cooperating witness to testify.' 82 Also commonplace are official-and
therefore discoverable-agreements in which the prosecution has promised
to extend some vaguely defined consideration (for example, a
recommendation for leniency at sentencing) to the cooperator accompanied
by oral statements such as, "[W]e'll just have to see how it goes, but if you
really come through at trial I will recommend in my substantial assistance
motion that the judge give you the street." 183
shift blame onto co-defendants and to minimize the appearance of their involvement in
criminal activities).
175. See United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1202 (C.D. Cal. 1999). The
court noted in Sudikoff as follows:
Because [the pretrial interview] process can be lengthy and because it often
carries some of the typical negotiating give-and-take, it is possible, maybe even
likely, that the witness's proposed testimony that was proffered at the beginning of
the process differed in some respects from the testimony proffered at the end of the
process.
Id.
176. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
177. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
178. See id.
179. See Cassidy, supra note 33, at 1132 (defining implied plea agreements as "soft
words of hope") (citations omitted).
180. See id. at 1152 (citing cases where courts have held that informal, verbal promises
do not qualify as discoverable Giglio material).
181. See id. at 1171 (calling implied plea agreements "pervasive").
182. See id. at 1158 (discussing the ease with which a prosecutor can induce accomplice
witness cooperation through a "wink and a nod") (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 1148.
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Absent any recording of the interview process, Cassidy has argued,
defense counsel will have no knowledge of such threats or inducements and
will therefore be unable to cross-examine the cooperator about the roles
such threats or inducements played in motivating the cooperator to
testify. 184 The jury thus will remain unaware of whether the prosecution
offered the cooperator no deal at all or an official leniency deal augmented
by oral assurances. 185 If the prosecution made a purely oral representation
to the cooperator, the cooperator may appear to testify at trial "straight-up.
. . because it is the right thing to do." 186 If the prosecution made an open-
ended deal, augmented by an oral promise, the jury may not be aware of the
magnitude of the benefit that the witness will receive for testifying. 187 In
both cases, the jury does not receive an accurate picture of the cooperator's
bias, and the jury is thus free to overvalue the cooperator's credibility. 188
3. Prosecutorial Contamination of the Interview
As noted above, the process by which prosecutors and their agents
interview cooperating witnesses is fraught with the potential that the
prosecutors and agents may inadvertently (or deliberately) feed information
to the cooperator. 189  As in the hypothetical described by Professor
Yaroshefsky, the prosecution may reveal key information to the cooperator
that the witness then incorporates into his account.190 And, as scholars
have remarked, much of the "coaching" that occurs is so subtle that the
interviewers themselves may be entirely unaware that they have supplied
information to the witness that the witness then has used to make his
account appear credible and convincing, first to the interviewer and later to
the jury.19t  Absent any recording of the interactions between the
government and the witness, the jury has no opportunity to learn the extent
to which the prosecutor has actively or unwittingly "coached" the witness
during the pretrial interviews. 192
B. Adequacy of Disclosure Rules and Cross-Examination as Safeguards
Commentators and practitioners have contended that neither rules of
prosecutorial disclosure nor the process of cross-examination ensure that
juries will have an adequate opportunity to consider certain evidence that
may arise during the government's unrecorded, pretrial interactions with a
cooperating witness and that may bear directly on the cooperator's
credibility. This evidence may consist of inconsistent statements, unofficial
184. See id. at 1160.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 1162 (internal quotations omitted).
187. Id. at 1162-63.
188. See id. at 1161-64.
189. See supra Part I.E.3.
190. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
191, See supra Part I.E.3.
192. See, e.g., Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 851-54.
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leniency agreements, or prosecutorial contamination of the interview
process.
1. Disclosure Rules
The Brady rule requires prosecutors to disclose "material" exculpatory or
impeachment evidence, and Model Rule 3.8 requires disclosure of evidence
that tends to negate or mitigate the defendant's guilt. 193 Practitioners and
legal observers have advanced three reasons why Brady and Model Rule
3.8(d) 194 do not motivate prosecutors to make arguably appropriate
disclosure decisions within the context of unrecorded interviews with
cooperating witnesses.
First, as prosecutors themselves have acknowledged, even the best-
intentioned prosecutors do not typically apply Brady analysis to oral
statements. 195 As one prosecutor has stated, "most oral statements do not
get turned over."196 A prosecutor is much more likely to mull over whether
or not he should turn over a written statement or other tangible document
than he is to ponder his disclosure obligations regarding unrecorded oral
statements. 197 Thus, unless a cooperator insists upon proclaiming facts
which the prosecutor really cannot ignore (for example, "I did it, the
defendant was not there"), a prosecutor is unlikely even to consider oral
statements as "evidence," within the meaning of the prosecutor's legal and
ethical disclosure duties. 198
Second, even assuming that a prosecutor recognizes that his disclosure
obligations may be implicated by a cooperator's pretrial oral statements,
many commentators have noted that the prosecutor is unlikely to decide in
favor of disclosure. Due process requires that the prosecutor disclose
evidence that is favorable and material to the defense. 199 Evidence is
"material" if there is a reasonable probability that admission of the evidence
would result in a better outcome for the defendant. 200 Although courts have
admonished prosecutors to err on the side of disclosure when determining
193. See supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text. Much has been written on
prosecutors' failure to comply with Brady. See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 33, at 1167-68
(commenting on the "considerable academic attention" that has been paid to the inadequacy
of constitutional due process requirements for "promoting full disclosure of evidence
favorable to the accused"); Weeks, supra note 89, at 933 (asserting that "the evidence that a
substantial number of prosecutors are regularly ignoring their duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence is by this point simply too compelling to ignore"). Discussion of whether
prosecutors tend to comply with Brady, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
194. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
195. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 57, at 962 ("The fact that you did not turn over the
witness's prior statement last week is not intentional. You just do not remember that they
said it last week. The prosecutor is paper conscious about its Brady obligations but not oral
conscious." (quoting a former AUSA)).
196. See id. at 962.
197. See Weeks, supra note 89, at 843-46.
198. See id.
199. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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whether evidence is "material," 20 1 as noted above prosecutors tend to
believe zealously in the defendant's guilt and will strive to define
"material" as narrowly as possible in order to obtain a conviction. 20 2 As
Professor Daniel Capra has written, even "assuming that the prosecutor acts
in good faith and with integrity, the fact is that he reviews his file from an
advocate's point of view. Good faith and integrity do not and cannot
guarantee an objective review of the file by the prosecutor." 203  A
prosecutor may believe in good faith that evidence of inconsistent
statements, for example, are irrelevant or only trivially related to the
question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and that admission of such
evidence would serve only to mislead or confuse the jury. 204
As Justice Thurgood Marshall stated in his dissent in United States v.
Bagley,
for purposes of Brady, the prosecutor must abandon his role as an
advocate and pore through his files, as objectively as possible, to identify
the material that could undermine his case. Given this obviously
unharmonious role, it is not surprising that these advocates oftentimes
overlook or downplay potentially favorable evidence, often in cases in
which there is no doubt that the failure to disclose was a result of absolute
good faith.205
Professor Joseph Weeks has written that due process and disciplinary
disclosure requirements do not ensure that prosecutors will make objective
disclosure decisions because
201. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1996) ("To the extent
the prosecutor is uncertain about the materiality of a piece of evidence, 'the prudent
prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure."') (quoting United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976)).
202. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongful Rights, Crim. Just., Spring 2003, at 4, 11
("[P]rosecutors faced with a duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence may in good
faith interpret that duty narrowly, for prosecutors come to believe zealously in the guilt of
those they accuse, inevitably coming to embrace the virtues of his or her own position."). In
rare cases where courts consider disciplining prosecutors for failure to disclose evidence, the
prosecutor invariably defends his decision to withhold evidence by claiming that he did not
believe the evidence to be material. See, e.g., Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa
State Bar Ass'n v. Ramey, 512 N.W.2d 569 (Iowa 1994), cited in Robert R. Rigg,
Investigation, Discovery, and Disclosure in Criminal Cases: An Iowa Perspective, 52 Drake
L. Rev. 739, 779 (2004). Even in Koubriti, where AUSA Convertino's own employer-the
Office of the United States Attorney-filed a Memorandum defining the numerous
documents that Convertino withheld as exculpatory and material, Convertino continued to
insist that "[e]ven if [he] had reason to know of the materials characterized as being
disclosable to the defense, that material was insubstantial, cumulative and would not have
encouraged the reasonable probability that a different verdict would have resulted after
trial." Molly McDonough, Terror Verdicts Dissolve: Investigations Continue into how
Detroit Case Went So Wrong, September 10, 2004, 3 No. 36 A.B.A. J. E-Report, at 2.
203. Capra, supra note 43, at 424.
204. See Daniel Richman, Proposals for Change: Expanding the Evidentiary Frame for
Cooperating Witnesses, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 893, 897 (2002) (discussing the prosecutor's
good-faith reluctance to reveal a cooperating witness's inconsistent statements to the jury on
the grounds that such inconsistencies may be "simply misleading, when taken out of
context").
205. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 696-97 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the kind of objective determination of materiality required by [due
process] is capable of being made only by saints. More mortal advocates
will understandably view such evidence as a "problem" that threatens to
undermine the case. The determination of whether it is really all that
exculpatory or of such significance that, if produced, there is a reasonable
probability that the defendant will be acquitted, becomes in many cases a
determination beyond the intellectual and emotional capacities of even the
most ethical of prosecutors. 2
0 6
Third, the "reasonable probability" materiality standard established in
Bagley20 7 requires prosecutors to speculate about the effect that admission
of the evidence in question (or its exclusion) would have on the jury's
verdict before the trial has begun, and prosecutors often will not know what
that effect could possibly be. 20 8 The difficulty of making hypothetical
materiality assessments may allow prosecutors to dismiss more easily a
witness's inconsistent statement as immaterial, on the grounds that the
prosecutor could not possibly know the effect of the statement upon a trial
that has not yet taken place.2
0 9
2. Cross-Examination
Cross-examination of the cooperating witness, coupled with mandatory
disclosure of leniency agreements as required by Giglio,2 10 is intended as "a
vital safeguard to uncovering improper preparation and coaching of
witnesses." 211 Cross-examination of cooperating witnesses ideally allows
jurors to get a complete picture of the witness's motivation for testifying
206. Weeks, supra note 89, at 843-44.
207. 473 U.S. at 682 (holding that non-disclosed evidence "is material only if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different").
208. See Cassidy, supra note 33, at 1168 (stating that the materiality requirement is
inadequate to promote necessary disclosure because a "prosecutor must make a pretrial
decision about disclosure by speculating about the post-trial effect of the evidence"). Some
courts have held, however, that prosecutors should not be forced to make disclosure
decisions based on speculations about the effect that the evidence in question will have on a
trial that has not yet begun. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 313 F. Supp. 2d 921, 925 (E.D.
Wis. 2004) (holding that, "[i]n the pre-trial context, the court should require disclosure of
favorable evidence under Brady and Giglio without attempting to analyze its materiality at
trial" because the court "cannot meaningfully evaluate how the addition of other evidence
would alter the trial. Therefore, the court should ordinarily require the pretrial disclosure of
all exculpatory or impeachment evidence"); United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196,
1199 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("[I]n the pretrial context it would be inappropriate to suppress
evidence because it seems insufficient to alter a jury's verdict .... [T]he government is
obligated to disclose all evidence relating to guilt or punishment which might reasonably be
considered favorable to the defendant's case."); see also Kurcias, supra note 73, at 1227-28
(observing that, prior to trial, when a prosecutor is deciding whether to disclose evidence,
the prosecutor may not be aware of the defense's theory of the case and therefore may be
unable to evaluate accurately whether the evidence in question would be truly material).
209. See Capra, supra note 43, at 420-25.
210. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
211. Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 854 (citing Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80
(1976)).
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and the extent to which the testimony is credible. 212 Legal observers have
remarked, however, that cross-examination, though intended to function as
the single greatest trial engine for discovering the truth,213 nonetheless does
not reveal the extent to which cooperating witnesses, during their
unrecorded pretrial interactions with prosecutors, made inconsistent
statements, received threats or unwritten inducements that may have
motivated them to testify, or manufactured testimony that was based on
information fed to them during the interview process. 214 Absent any
recording and disclosure of the interviews, defense counsel will have no
factual basis for questioning the witness about any uncertainties or
inconsistencies in the cooperator's statements that may have surfaced (and
then been ironed out) during the interview process. 215  As Professor
Douglass has observed, cross-examination also may prove ineffective
because the "polishing process can transmogrify demeanor just as it can
smooth out gaps and contradictions in the substance of accomplice
testimony." 216 Similarly, as Professor Cassidy has noted, in the absence of
any recordation of the interview process, defense counsel has no basis for
questioning a cooperating witness about any implied threat or inducement
that the prosecution made during pretrial meetings. 217
Scholars also have observed that, just as defense counsel lacks a factual
basis to conduct an effective cross-examination that could reveal whether
the cooperator made inconsistent statements or received unofficial threats
or inducements during the interview process, defense counsel also has no
foundation for cross-examining the cooperator about whether his testimony
was the product of information supplied by the government. 218 Although
212. See Cassidy, supra note 33, at 1142 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,
311 (1966)).
213. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (internal quotation omitted); see
also Harris, supra note 23, at 66 ("Because all substantive communications with testifying
cooperators would be recorded and discoverable, cross-examination at trial could penetrate
the selection and preparation process to a degree not now possible.").
214. See, e.g., Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 854-55.
215. See id.
216. Douglass, supra note 22, at 1843. Douglass writes the following:
The purely visual effect of [the witness preparation] process can be stunning.
Shoulder-length hair gives way to a conservative trim. Fearsome tattoos disappear
behind a well-pressed shirt sleeve. Courtroom attire-not too casual, not too
formal-replaces orange prison garb or a grease-stained T-shirt. Even language
patterns can go through a Pygmalian-like transformation before trial. Four letter
words take on additional syllables and a softer edge. As a result, the defendant
may confront his accomplice at trial, but he may not recognize the person who
speaks from the witness stand.
Id. at 1843.
217. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text; see also Witness Coaching, supra
note 22, at 855 n.133. Gershman writes that
if a cross-examiner is unaware of, or does not believe that any deals or promises
were made to the witness in exchange for his testimony, it is unlikely that an
experienced cross-examiner would ask the witness about hypothetical deals or
promises or whether the witness was coached to avoid mentioning the subject.
Id.
218. See Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 848.
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defense counsel "will be able to elicit acknowledgment that the witness has
met with the prosecution to prepare, a well-prepared witness' account of
those sessions will be otherwise opaque: 'The prosecutor asked me the
same questions she asked me today and told me to tell the truth."' 219 This
bare-bones acknowledgment will provide the jury with "little insight into
the significance and nuance of the prosecutor's effectively exclusive
opportunity to prepare and rehearse with the witness for what is often the
crucial testimony in an accomplice case." 220
C. Arguments for Reform in the Government's Development and Use of
Cooperating Witness Testimony
Professor Bennett Gershman attributes "many, perhaps most"221 of the
wrongful convictions that result from false witness testimony "to
techniques used by prosecutors to prepare, shape, and polish the testimony
of their witnesses." 222  Specifically, Gershman identifies the following
factors as responsible for the threat posed by cooperating witness testimony
to the truth-seeking function of criminal trials:
[A cooperating witness is] (1) easily manipulated by coercive and
suggestive interviewing techniques; (2) readily capable of giving false
and embellished testimony with the prosecutor's knowledge,
acquiescence, indifference, or ignorance; (3) readily capable of creating
false impressions by omissions or memory alterations that in the absence
of any recordation or documentation eludes disclosure and impeachment;
and (4) able to present his testimony to the jury in a truthful and
convincing manner, which because of the nature of the cooperation
process is difficult to impeach through cross-examination. 223
In a similar vein, Michael Ross has summarized the reasons why many
observers believe that the current use of cooperating witness testimony by
prosecutors requires additional safeguards as follows:
Given that prosecutors, as advocates, want to win; that they intentionally
or unintentionally press for witnesses to provide badly needed evidence in
a case; that cooperating witnesses are powerfully driven to lie; and that
history has taught the legal community that the combined conduct of
219. Harris, supra note 23, at 55.
220. Id.
221. Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 832.
222. Id. at 833. In addition to cooperators, Gershman identifies eyewitnesses and
children as witnesses whose pretrial interactions with police and prosecutors are particularly
fraught with the danger that false or inaccurate testimony will develop:
[N]otoriously unreliable witnesses include identification witnesses, young
children, and cooperating witnesses such as informants, accomplices, and so-called
"snitches." The vast majority of wrongful convictions are attributable to the
testimony of these witnesses. The testimony of these witnesses share common
risks to the truth; they pose special dangers of falsehood and mistake of which the
prosecutor is aware but the jury is not.
Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 309, 343
(2001) [hereinafter Prosecutor's Duty].
223. Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 848.
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prosecutors and cooperating witnesses result in false testimony, it is not
enough for the government to repeat its mantra that "the government
recognizes its obligations under Brady and will comply." An external
presence is needed to ensure the integrity of the process. 224
Commentators have proposed a number of reforms that could reduce the
risk that cooperating witnesses will testify falsely but convincingly. The
most drastic reform would be to make the testimony of cooperating
witnesses inadmissible. 225 One Canadian judge, in response to a study of a
wrongful Canadian conviction that was largely caused by fabricated
"snitch" testimony, has recommended that no jailhouse informants be
allowed to testify at criminal trials. 226 Other writers have countered that
proposal, however, with the argument that cooperating witness testimony
simply cannot be dispensed with, because the government requires such
testimony in order to obtain a great number of valid convictions, and that
without such testimony, many important prosecutions "could never make it
to court.
' 227
Other proposed reforms include providing extensive training to
prosecutors and agents in interviewing techniques and "a better
understanding of the psychological factors at play when defendants seek to
cooperate and, generally, when people lie";228 pretrial court hearings to
determine the reliability of the cooperating witness;229 the mandatory
presence of the cooperating witness's counsel at all pretrial meetings, in
order to keep the prosecution "honest"; 230 an amendment to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, codifying Brady and requiring the disclosure
of all evidence, including oral statements, that is favorable to the accused,
regardless of "materiality"; 231 and a rule requiring prosecutors to fulfill
leniency agreements prior to the cooperating witness's testimony, thereby
224. Ross, supra note 34, at 891 (quoting United States v. Roberts, No. 01 CR 410, 2001
WL 1602123, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2001); see also Cassidy, supra note 33, at 1176.
The likelihood of fabrication resulting from bargained-for testimony is simply
too great to rely on a prosecutor's honor and good faith in meeting his discovery
obligations with respect to accomplice witnesses. Prosecutors are advocates with
strong personal and professional incentives to win their cases. The criminal justice
system cannot continue to rely on bald exhortations to prosecutors to "seek
justice" and expect that a defendant's right to a fair trial will be protected.
Id.
225. See Hughes, supra note 46, at 24, 33.
226. See Diane L. Martin, Lessons About Justice from the "Laboratory" of Wrongful
Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC L.
Rev. 847, 863 (2002).
227. Trott, supra note 110, at 1390.
228. Cohen, supra note 105, at 826.
229. See Harris, supra note 23, at 63-64 (recommending pretrial reliability hearings for
all "compensated witnesses").
230. Cohen, supra note 150, at 873-74.
231. See American Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Proposal: Proposed Codification of
Disclosure of Favorable Information Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and
16, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 93 (2004).
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partially removing the incentive for the witness to lie at trial. 232 Another
proposal, which functions as a partial recording rule, is an amendment to
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that would require a prosecutor to
record in writing any express or implied statement that "a reasonable person
in the prosecutor's position would expect to create a subjective expectation
of leniency on the part of the witness." 233
D. Arguments in Support of and Opposed to a Recording Rule
In addition to the above-mentioned proposals for reform of the process
by which the government prepares and uses cooperating witness testimony
at criminal trials, a number of commentators, practitioners, and bodies that
study wrongful convictions have advocated the adoption of a rule requiring
that the government record all pretrial interviews with cooperating
witnesses. This section briefly examines these proposals and then presents
arguments that have been advanced, as well as arguments that could be
advanced, in support of such a rule. This section concludes by considering
some arguments in opposition to a recording rule.
1. Past Proposals for a Recording Rule
Several legal writers have suggested that prosecutors and their agents
should record their interviews with cooperators. Professor Gershman has
proposed the mandatory videotaping of all government interviews with
cooperating witnesses. 234 Michael Ross has suggested that prosecutors or
their agents should record all of the information provided by the
cooperating witness and/or his counsel during proffer sessions, and that
"should the prosecutor later learn that information provided by the witness
is inconsistent with information provided by other sources, or should the
defendant alter or amend his or her recollection of the facts, these matters
must be memorialized. ' 235 Similarly, George Harris recommends that all
232. See Hughes, supra note 46, at 24 (citing Franklin v. State, 577 P.2d 860 (Nev.
1978)). In Franklin, the prosecution provisionally agreed to allow an accomplice witness to
plead to second rather than first degree murder and thus avoid the death penalty. Franklin,
577 P.2d at 860. The prosecution, however, refused to make the plea deal until after the
cooperating witness gave his testimony. Id. at 861. The court held that the prosecution's
arrangement with the cooperating witness presented such a high risk of inducing the
cooperator's perjury that the defendant was denied due process. Id. at 860, 864. The Nevada
Supreme Court overruled Franklin in Sheriff, Humboldt County v. Acuna, 819 P.2d 197
(Nev. 1991), holding that "bargaining for specific trial testimony, i.e., testimony that is
essentially consistent with the information represented to be factually true during
negotiations with the State, and withholding the benefits of the bargain until after the witness
has testified, is not inconsistent with the search for truth or due process," id. at 198.
233. Cassidy, supra note 33, at 1173.
234. See Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 861-62. Gershman also proposes the
mandatory videotaping of all government interviews with two other classes of witnesses that
he identifies as "dangerous" to the truth-seeking process: child witnesses and identification
witnesses. Id.
235. Ross, supra note 34, at 888; see also Governor's Comm'n on Capital Punishment,
Report of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment 30 (2002) [hereinafter
Report], available at
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communications between the prosecution and a potential cooperating
witness be audiotaped, videotaped, or transcribed, that the recordings be
disclosed to the defendant, and that defense counsel have the opportunity to
interview all cooperating witnesses. 236
Prosecutors themselves have commented that the common practice of not
taking notes of witness statements is a "major problem in trying to create an
element of fundamental fairness in a trial. ' 2 3 7 One prosecutor, interviewed
by Professor Yaroshefsky, has stated that he believed that taking notes
during interviews with cooperating witnesses should be mandatory. 238
In addition, bodies and organizations that study wrongful convictions and
their causes have recommended that prosecutors and/or police record their
interviews with cooperating witnesses. For example, Illinois Governor
George H. Ryan's Commission on Capital Punishment recommended that
police record all "interviews conducted of significant witnesses" in
homicide cases. 239  The Innocence Project, at the Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, has recommended that all communications between
prosecutors or police and cooperating witnesses be videotaped. 240 Legal
scholars, in drafting a Model Act for the Prevention and Remedy of
Wrongful Convictions, have proposed that "[all interviews related to
felony investigations, whether in the field or at the police station, will be
audio or video recorded. '241 The Canadian criminal justice system, in
response to an exhaustive study of the causes of a Canadian wrongful
conviction, implemented a rule requiring that all government interviews
with accomplices and informants be videotaped or audiotaped. 242 And the
Center on Wrongful Convictions recommends that: "Interrogations of
informants by investigators should be recorded-preferably video-taped,
but if that is not possible audio-taped-and the tapes should be accessible to
the defense under normal discovery rules." 243
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission-report/summary-recommendations.
pdf (report commissioned by Governor Ryan to suggest reforms in Illinois' capital
punishment system, recommending that all discussions with cooperating witnesses and/or
their attorneys concerning "benefits, potential benefits, or detriments" should be "reduced to
writing, and ... disclosed to the defense" prior to trial).
236. Harris, supra note 23, at 62; see also Jannice E. Joseph, Note, The New Russian
Roulette: Brady Revisited, 17 Cap. Def. J. 33, 48 (2004) (advocating the "memorialization
of witness rehearsal sessions").
237. Panel Discussion, supra note 69, at 787 (remarks of AUSA G. Doug Jones).
238. Yaroshefsky, supra note 57, at 962.
239. Report, supra note 235, at 20.
240. See The Innocence Project at Cardozo Sch. of Law, Wrongful Convictions, Causes
and Remedies, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/snitches.php (last visited July 13,
2005) ("Any deal or reward offered or accepted with regard to informants or snitches must
be in writing. All verbal communication should be videotaped.").
241. Michael J. Sacks et al., Toward a Model Act for the Prevention and Remedy of
Erroneous Convictions, 35 New Eng. L. Rev. 669, 672 (2001).
242. See Barry Scheck et al., Actual Innocence: When Justice Goes Wrong and How to
Make It Right 355-56 (2003).
243. Rob Warden, Center on Wrongful Convictions, Causes and Remedies: The Snitch
System (Apr. 25, 2002),
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2. Possible Arguments in Favor of a Recording Rule
Proponents of a recording rule could assert three main arguments in
support of the adoption of such a rule. First, a rule requiring the recording
of interviews with cooperating witnesses could promote the accuracy of
juries' verdicts, thereby limiting the likelihood of wrongful convictions.2 44
Second, a recording rule could help to ensure that prosecutors function in a
manner that is consistent with the ideals of ethical prosecutorial behavior
that are set forth in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.24 5 Third, a
recording rule could diminish the appearance of impropriety that naturally
attaches to secretive pretrial meetings with cooperators, thereby enhancing
the public's faith in the criminal justice system.246
a. Decrease the Likelihood of Wrongful Convictions
The foremost argument to be made in support of a recording rule is that
such a rule could reduce the chance that a defendant would be convicted on
the basis of false or misleading cooperating witness testimony.24 7 The
recording of meetings between a prosecutor and a cooperator could reveal
the extent to which the witness made inconsistent statements over the
course of multiple interviews; 24 8 whether the government made any non-
disclosed threats or inducements to the witness; 24 9 and the extent to which
the cooperator's trial testimony was the result of the witness's being
deliberately or inadvertently "fed" information, rather than the witness's
personal knowledge. 250 Professor Cassidy asserts that recordation "may
assist jurors in the difficult and highly subtle task of detecting fabrication
where it occurs." 25 1 And, Professor Gershman states as follows:
Recording the interview session is essential to disclose the presence or
extent of.. . different types of suggestive influences.... Taping would
reveal overt attempts to influence the witness's testimony by use of
leading questions or other cues that alert the witness to the expected
answer. Whereas recording of the sessions would not necessarily reveal
whether a witness's story was a fabrication from the start, it might
demonstrate whether the witness embellished his story to please the
government or filled in details to make the story more complete or
persuasive, and the extent to which his story crystallized and became
more confident over several interview sessions. 252
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/Causes/Snitch.htm (last visited Dec.
5, 2004).
244. See infra Part II.D.2.a.
245. See infra Part II.D.2.b.
246. See infra Part II.D.2.c.
247. See Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 832-33.
248. See supra Part II. A. 1.
249. See supra Part II.A.2.
250. See supra Part II.A.3.
251. Cassidy, supra note 33, at 1177.
252. Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 862.
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The possible value of a recording rule in allowing juries to make more
informed judgments about the credibility of a cooperating witness is seen in
the above-mentioned hypothetical of a cooperator's interaction with the
government, cited in Yaroshefsky's article. 253  In that example, the
cooperator could testify at trial that Jones was present at the drug deal. But,
equipped with recordings of the meeting between the prosecutor and
witness, defense counsel could then ask the witness whether it was true that
the witness had at first failed to mention Jones's presence and that the
witness had actually stated that Jones was present only after the prosecutor
or agent specifically asked, "Are you sure Jones was not there?" 254 If the
witness replied that he had stated that Jones was present without any
prodding from the government, defense counsel could impeach the witness
with evidence of the transcript, audiotape, or videotape of the interview. 255
By revealing such evidence of witness inconsistency, unrecorded threats
or inducements, and prosecutorial contamination of the interview, a
recording rule could provide defense counsel with a foundation for cross-
examination that would not exist in the absence of the recording: "Because
all substantive communications with testifying cooperators would be
recorded and discoverable, cross-examination at trial could penetrate the
selection and preparation process to a degree not now possible." 256 By
revealing aspects of the pretrial preparation process that bear directly on the
cooperator's credibility, a recording rule would comport with the core
principle behind broad discovery in criminal trials, namely the goal of
"enhanc[ing] the truth-finding process so as to minimize the danger that an
innocent defendant will be convicted." 257
b. Comport with Prosecutors' Ethical Mandate
As a rule that intends to combat the development of false cooperating
witness testimony, the recording rule conceivably comports with the
prosecutor's mandate to act as a "minister of justice."258 The prosecutor's
role as a "minister of justice" derives in part from the prosecutor's function
253. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
255. See Fed. R. Evid. 613(b) (permitting the impeachment of a witness by "[e]xtrinsic
evidence of a prior inconsistent statement" if "the witness is afforded an opportunity to
explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the
witness thereon").
256. Harris, supra note 23, at 66.
257. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest For
Truth? A Progress Report, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1990).
258. Model Rules of Prof 1 Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. (stating that "[a] prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate"); see also Model
Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 7-13 ("The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs
from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.");
Standards Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice § 3-1.2(c) (1992) ("The duty of the
prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.").
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as an attorney for the sovereign state 259-the prosecutor's sole client-
whose "paramount objective" it is to ensure not only that the guilty are
punished, but also that the innocent are not wrongfully convicted.260 The
ethical admonition for prosecutors to act as "ministers of justice," is thus, in
large part, a call for prosecutors to guard against wrongful convictions. 261
As the Comment to Model Rule 3.8 states, the prosecutor's "responsibility
carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded
procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient
evidence." 262
The obligation to act as a "minister of justice" has been interpreted as
imposing upon the prosecutor a broad obligation, beyond that imposed by
specific legal or ethical provisions, "to ensure the truthfulness of their
witnesses' testimony." 263  Thus, the prosecutor must make objective
assessments of the evidence that he develops and uses against a defendant
at trial.2 64 Crucially, to fulfill his role as a "minister of justice," the
prosecutor has an obligation "to understand and guard against cooperating
witnesses infecting criminal investigations with lies and half-truths." 265
This obligation
includes avoiding techniques for interviewing witnesses and preparing
them to testify [in ways] that are likely to produce false testimony, taking
care not to offer inducements to witnesses (such as immunity or leniency)
in a manner that encourages false testimony, and not presenting testimony
when there is good reason to doubt its veracity.266
A recording rule would conceivably help the prosecutor fulfill this
obligation. The rule's existence would acknowledge that even the most
careful and best-intentioned prosecutors may unknowingly assist in
developing the false testimony of lying cooperators, 267 that prosecutors
often do not act with sufficient objectivity to make fair disclosure
decisions, 268 and that, therefore, "doing justice" may demand that
259. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 Fordham Urb.
L.J. 607, 637 (1999) (stating that prosecutors "must act in accordance with the client's
objectives, as reflected in the constitution and statutes, as well as history and tradition").
260. See id. at 641; see also Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial
Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 45, 50 (1991) ("One
obvious concern underlying the prosecutor's special ethical duty is to prevent punishment of
innocent defendants.").
261. See Green, supra note 259, at 642 (declaring that "among the sovereign's paramount
objectives are not merely to convict and punish lawbreakers but to avoid harming, and
certainly to avoid punishing, innocent people").
262. Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. (1) (2003).
263. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics, supra note 90, at 1596.
264. See Prosecutor's Duty, supra note 222, at 337 ("Although not articulated in judicial
decisions, a prosecutor's duty to truth embraces a duty to make an independent evaluation of
the credibility of his witnesses, the reliability of forensic evidence, and the truth of the
defendant's guilt.").
265. Cohen, supra note 105, at 827.
266. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics, supra note 90, at 1596.
267. See supra Part I.E.4.
268. See supra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
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prosecutors effectively recuse themselves from making disclosure decisions
in the context of their interviews with cooperating witnesses.
Several judicial decisions concede the lack of a legal duty to record their
interviews with government witnesses but nonetheless consider prosecutors
and their agents to have acted unethically when they deliberately fail to
record. The language of these decisions supports the notion that a
recording rule would comport with commentators' understanding of the
prosecutor's role as a "minister of justice." In United States v. Houlihan,2 69
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the supervisors of
a drug investigation explicitly instructed government agents to avoid taking
notes of their interviews with all government witnesses.2 70  While
acknowledging that this practice did not violate the Jencks Act, the court
nevertheless questioned the propriety of the government's actions:
Eschewing tape recordings and ordering law enforcement agents not to
take notes during pretrial interviews is risky business-and not
guaranteed to redound either to the sovereign's credit or to its benefit. By
adopting a "what we don't create can't come back to haunt us" approach,
prosecutors demean their primary mission: to see that justice is done....
By and large, the legitimate interests of law enforcement will be better
served by using recording equipment and/or taking accurate notes than by
playing hide-and-seek. 27 1
Similarly, in United States v. Bernard,27 2 a DEA agent deliberately
avoided taking notes during his several interviews with a government
informant who eventually provided key testimony against the defendant. 273
Although the Ninth Circuit could "find no statutory basis for compelling the
creation of Jencks Act material," 274 the court nevertheless severely
condemned the government's policy of willfully avoiding the taking of
notes:
We emphatically disapprove of Agent Fredericks' views and
motivation, and his conduct. His testimony announces a desire to deprive
defendants of knowledge of any statements favorable to them that may
have been made to him by the informant. This seems to us to be quite
inconsistent with the obligations of a law enforcement officer
representing the United States Government. Such an officer has a duty to
gather all of the facts about an offense, so far as time and his abilities
permit, not just those facts that the agent thinks helpful to obtaining a
conviction. His superiors and the prosecuting authorities must rely on
him to do so. Both he and they have a duty to protect the innocent as well
as to catch and prosecute the guilty. And that duty extends to being fair
to those whom he may believe to be guilty. Playing games with evidence,
269. 92 F.3d 1271 (1st Cir. 1996).
270. Id. at 1288.
271. Id. at 1289.
272. 625 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1980).
273. Id. at 859.
274. Id.
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as Agent Fredericks has done, demeans him, his agency, and the
government itself.275
In its Memorandum in Koubriti, the U.S. Attorney's Office adopted a
similar stance to that taken by the court in Bernard. The Memorandum
noted that Convertino's colleagues considered Convertino's deliberate
avoidance of note taking to be "ill-advised," 276 but also observed that the
practice was not unlawful.2 77 Thus, although a prosecutor and the agents
working under his direction may deliberately avoid recording their
interviews with government witnesses without violating due process or
statutory disclosure requirements, some courts have condemned the practice
as being contrary to the ethical responsibility of government agents to seek
justice and guard against wrongful convictions.
Proponents of a recording rule also could argue that such a rule would
comport with the ethical duties of a prosecutor by encouraging caution and
self-reflection among prosecutors as they interact with cooperators. Part of
an ethical rule's value inheres in the "continuing legal and ethical education
[the rule] provoke[s] ' '27 8 and in the rule's ability to cause lawyers to think
more deeply about their professional responsibilities. 279 Obliged to record
interviews with snitches and accomplices, prosecutors might think more
carefully about how they conducted those interviews. Prosecutors might
become more careful about offering "off-the-record" threats or inducements
to would-be cooperators. Similarly, it could be argued that prosecutors
would exercise similar caution against the possibility of inadvertently
feeding information to the cooperator. And, because taping would reveal
"overt attempts to influence the witness's testimony," 280 prosecutors who
would otherwise deliberately threaten or bribe cooperating witnesses, or
unlawfully provide the witness with the testimony that the prosecution
wanted to use, would be deterred from such overt coaching of witnesses. In
sum, a duty to record interviews with cooperators could arguably prompt
prosecutors to reflect in greater depth on the inherent dangers of such
testimony, the prospect of wrongful convictions, and the prosecutor's duty
to prevent punishment of the innocent. 28 1
275. Id.
276. Memorandum, supra note 4, at 46.
277. See id. at 47 n.30.
278. Zacharias, supra note 260, at 107.
279. See Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory,
Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 223, 258-59
(1993) ("By forcing lawyers to think in ethical and systemic terms, the codes hope to
promote an introspective process that carries over to situations the drafters do not, and
perhaps cannot, foresee.").
280. Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 862.
281. The capacity of a recording rule to encourage self-reflection among prosecutors also
potentially serves another provision in the ethics code: Standard 3-1.2(d), which states that
the prosecutor has a duty to "seek to reform and improve the administration of criminal
justice." Standards Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice § 3-1.2(d) (1992). A
recording rule would constitute an acknowledgment that unrecorded prosecutorial interviews
with cooperating witnesses have the great potential to contribute to wrongful convictions.
The recording rule thus comports with the attorney's duty to seek to reform the criminal
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c. Diminish the Appearance of Prosecutorial Impropriety
Proponents of a recording rule might also argue that the rule could
combat the appearance of impropriety that attaches to unrecorded meetings
between prosecutors and cooperators. As Professor Roberta Flowers has
stated, "[T]he appearance of fairness is an essential consideration in
evaluating the quality of any justice system."2 82 When lawyers prepare the
testimony of witnesses during private, unrecorded sessions, "it is difficult
for the lawyer and witness to avoid the appearance that they have invented
a convenient story for the jury."283 Secret pretrial meetings between
government agents and witnesses who are highly motivated to provide the
prosecution with whatever testimony the prosecution wants to hear run
especially counter to notions of propriety and fairness. In recent years
especially, when a spate of widely publicized wrongful convictions has
challenged the public's faith in the criminal justice system,284 and when
many overturned convictions have been attributed to the government's use
of false cooperating witness testimony,285 secret prosecutorial interviews
with snitches and accomplices have a particular appearance of impropriety.
It could therefore be argued that, in bringing transparency to the
government's interactions with untrustworthy witnesses, the recording rule
would accomplish the valuable goal of making the criminal justice system
appear more trustworthy.
3. Possible Arguments Against a Recording Rule
Although a number of legal observers have advocated the adoption of a
recording rule, 286 apart from two limited exceptions 2 87 none have discussed
justice system. In addition, a recording rule may also implicate Model Rule 3.3 (entitled
"Candor Toward the Tribunal"). By ensuring that the defendant, the court, and the jury have
an opportunity to accurately assess the credibility of cooperating witnesses, the recording
rule could be said to serve the prosecutor's duty of "fair dealing" and candor towards the
court. See Aaron, supra note 71, at 3007 (discussing how broader discovery obligations are
consistent with a prosecutor's duty of candor and fair dealing).
282. Roberta K. Flowers, What You See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of
Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 Mo. L. Rev. 699, 700 (1998). Flowers advocates
amending the Model Rules to include a provision requiring prosecutors to avoid the
appearance of impropriety. See id.
283. John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 277, 279 (1989).
284. See, e.g., Taslitz, supra note 202, at 5 (citing a July 2000 Harris poll, in which
ninety-four percent of people stated that they believed innocent people were convicted of
murder and that people on average believed that thirteen percent of those convicted for
murder were actually innocent).
285. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
286. See supra Part II.D.1.
287. Professor Gershman, in advocating a recording rule, has briefly considered possible
objections to a recording rule on the grounds that recording of pretrial interviews could
reveal sensitive information to the defense. See infra note 326 and accompanying text. Joel
Cohen, in opposing a recording rule, has argued that recordings of cooperating witness
interviews would threaten the safety of witnesses, facilitate defendants' opportunities to give
false testimony, and chill discourse between prosecutors and cooperators. See infra note 299
and accompanying text.
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the possible arguments that could be made against the adoption of such a
rule. There are four possible arguments to be made against the adoption of
a recording rule. First, the mandatory recording of all interviews with
cooperating witnesses would provide the defense with a large amount of
arguably irrelevant or trivial impeachment material, the use of which at trial
could lead the jury to undervalue the testimony of cooperators. 288 Second,
a recording rule would inhibit the use of credible cooperating witness
testimony in criminal trials, because mandatory recordings would pose
threats to cooperators' safety and would chill discourse between
cooperators and prosecutors in proffer sessions. 289 Third, by revealing all
pretrial statements made by cooperating witnesses, a recording rule would
allow defendants to falsify their testimony so that it convincingly countered
the inculpatory statements of the cooperating witness.290  Fourth, a
recording rule would not be effective because prosecutors and their agents
could easily bypass such a rule.291
a. Excessive Impeachment Material
The recording rule could promote inaccurate trial results by allowing the
jury to consider an excessive amount of impeachment evidence. Because
evidentiary rules tend to be inclusive, rather than exclusive, 292 defense
counsel would be able to introduce many, if not most, of the inconsistent
statements made by cooperators during pretrial interviews. The admission
of copious impeachment evidence could lead juries to reject testimony that
was otherwise reliable. 293 One commentator, writing about mandatory
videotaping of government interviews with alleged child sex abuse victims,
has summarized the government's arguments regarding the potentially
prejudicial effect of such broad discovery:
[A] videotaped record fuels the effectiveness of cross-examination, and
[the fear] that overreaching, overzealous defense counsel will misuse any
discrepancies in the [witness]'s account or flaws in the interviewer's
elicitation of the narrative to undermine or even destroy the [witness]'s
credibility. Furthermore, many prosecutors believe that juries and judges
cannot tell the difference between minor and major inconsistencies or
between core and peripheral details, and that triers of fact cannot
288. See infra Part II.D.3.a.
289. See infra Part II.D.3.b.
290. See infra Part II.D.3.c.
291. See infra Part II.D.3.d.
292. See, e.g., Jacques v. Clean-Up Group, Inc., 96 F.3d 506, 516 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding
Rule 403, which states that relevant evidence shall be admitted unless its probative value is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value, "is a liberal rule under which relevant
evidence generally is admitted" (citation and internal quotation omitted).
293. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 682 (1957) (Clark, J., dissenting)
(asserting that granting defendants access to impeachment evidence in the government's
possession could result in that evidence being "subject to misinterpretation .... quoted out of
context, or... used to thwart truth, distort half-truths, and misrepresent facts" (quoting J.
Edgar Hoover's 1950 speech before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the United States Senate)).
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distinguish between the effective use of cross-examination and its
misuse.294
The potential for prejudice could be especially great because of the
defense's access to all of the statements made by the cooperator during
early proffer sessions. As discussed earlier, cooperating witnesses
commonly lie at the outset of proffer sessions in order to "feel out" the
government agents and determine how they can best negotiate a favorable
plea deal.295 Even fully credible cooperators may lie at the outset of their
meetings with the prosecution. 296 While a prosecutor might correctly
perceive that a jailhouse informant's lying at the first proffer session is
nothing more than a routine negotiating technique, a fact finder could
perceive the fabrications to be dispositive of the cooperator's
untrustworthiness. Thus, in such situations, the recording rule could result
in the jury's undervaluing of an honest cooperator's testimony, leading to
lost valid convictions.
b. Inhibition of Cooperating Witness Testimony
A recording rule could discourage the participation of cooperating
witnesses in criminal trials. Courts have recognized that cooperating
witnesses play an important role in the criminal justice system in that they
"are often the best, if not the only, source of information about the alleged
crime."297 In limiting the scope of discovery allowed under the Jencks Act,
Congress had the goal of preventing the "[d]iscouragement of witnesses"
and "improper contact directed at influencing [witnesses'] testimony." 298 A
recording rule could discourage credible cooperators from testifying, by
posing threats to their safety. A would-be cooperator, fearful that a
defendant who learned of the cooperator's partnership with the prosecution
might attempt to harm the witness or the witness's family prior to trial,
would understandably be hesitant to cooperate or might not cooperate with
full candor. Joel Cohen, a former federal prosecutor, has warned that
[a] recording may ultimately end up in the hands of criminals who may
actually want to kill [the cooperator's] family-at a time when he still
believes that he can successfully eliminate them from the prosecution
equation-[which] may increase the likelihood of deliberate lying or
obfuscation by him, and invariably undermine the interview process.
299
294. Lucy S. McGough, Good Enough for Government Work: The Constitutional Duty to
Preserve Forensic Interviews of Child Victims, 65 Law and Contemp. Probs. 179, 189
(2002).
295. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 57, at 961-62.
296. See Trott, supra note 110, at 1403-04.
297. United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1197 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
298. Win. Bradford Middlekauff, What Practitioners Say About Broad Criminal
Discovery Practice: More Just-or Just More Dangerous?, 9 Crim. Just. 14, 54 (1994)
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 414, at 12 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 716); see also
Brennan, supra note 257, at 6-8 (discussing judicial arguments in favor of limiting
government discovery requirements after the passage of the Jencks Act).
299. Cohen, supra note 150, at 872.
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Over the course of one year, in one federal district, defendants killed or
ordered the killing of six cooperating witnesses before those witnesses had
the chance to testify. 300
In addition, a recording rule could chill the necessary give and take that
occurs between prosecutors, agents, and potential cooperators in early
proffer sessions. During these sessions, witnesses lie, prosecutors expect
them to lie, and honest testimony may nevertheless develop in due
course.301  A recording rule could result in prosecutors insisting that
cooperators come forward immediately with the truth. Unable to "feel out"
the prosecution, the would-be cooperator could be reluctant to enter into the
process. As Joel Cohen has written, "Tape recording would-be cooperators,
particularly those who initially are willing to make only stingy disclosures
and where prosecutors must necessarily be more forceful, would inhibit the
process-even when employed by the most ethical of prosecutors." 30 2
c. Assist Defendant in Testifying Falsely
A recording rule would give the defendant the opportunity to scrutinize
the incriminating remarks of adverse cooperating witnesses and to tailor his
own testimony in a way that best counters the cooperator's testimony.
Thus, a recording rule could help defendants to mount successfully perjured
defenses.303
d. Prosecutors Could Bypass the Rule
Prosecutors could bypass the recording rule. For example, prosecutors
could hold unrecorded charging discussions with would-be cooperators'
attorneys, who would then relay the prosecution's "needs" to the
witnesses.304 Alternatively, prosecutors could simply choose not to follow
the recording rule, and continue to conduct unrecorded meetings with
cooperators, just as prosecutors routinely choose not to disclose tangible
exculpatory evidence that should be disclosed under Brady and Model Rule
3.8(d).305
300. See Panel Discussion, supra note 69, at 787-88 (remarks of AUSA G. Doug Jones).
301. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
302. Cohen, supra note 150, at 872.
303. See Brennan, supra note 257, at 6 (discussing judicial opinions that claim that
"disclosure of witness lists would allow defendants to tailor their defenses to the
government's evidence and to fabricate testimony").
304. See, e.g., Spicer v. Roxbury Corr. Inst., 194 F.3d 547 (4th Cir. 1999); see also
Harris, supra note 23, at 67.
305. See Kurcias, supra note 73, at 1218 (discussing pervasiveness of Brady violations).
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III. PROPOSAL FOR THE ADOPTION OF A MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT REQUIRING PROSECUTORS TO RECORD PRETRIAL INTERVIEWS
WITH COOPERATING WITNESSES
Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct should be amended
to provide that prosecutors shall record all interviews with cooperating
witnesses and that prosecutors, whenever possible, shall ensure that the
government agents working with them also record all interviews with
cooperating witnesses.
Cooperating witness testimony presents a threat to the truth-seeking
function of criminal trials. The trial testimony of cooperating witnesses is
the product of unrecorded meetings between conviction-hungry prosecutors
who have extraordinary discretion to grant leniency 306 and desperate
criminal defendants who are eager to say whatever it takes to obtain that
leniency.307  Cooperating witnesses have the motive and skill to lie
successfully, 30 8 and prosecutors for many reasons tend to believe
cooperators and are not good at detecting those lies.309 It is not surprising
that the testimony of jailhouse snitches and accomplice witnesses has
proven to be one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions. 310
Without documentation of the interview process, jurors do not have the
opportunity to weigh important evidence that is likely to come to light over
the course of the government's interviews with these inherently suspect
witnesses. Jurors will not learn whether cooperators made inconsistent
statements over the course of the interviews, 311 whether the government
made any off-the-record threats or inducements that may have motivated
the witness to testify, 312 or whether the cooperator's account of events was
based on information that the witness learned during the interview
process. 313 Discovery obligations do not ensure that such evidence gets
disclosed, because-absent recording of interviews-prosecutors may not
identify such evidence where it exists or because prosecutors tend to view
such evidence as not sufficiently impeaching or exculpatory to warrant
disclosure.314 And cross-examination does not function as an adequate
safeguard, because without any documentation of the interview process,
defense counsel has no basis for questioning the process by which the
government developed the witness's testimony. 315
As many legal commentators have recognized, some greater measure is
required.316 A recording rule provides such a measure. A rule requiring
306. See supra Part I.A.
307. See supra Part I.E. 1.
308. See supra Part I.E. 1-2.
309. See supra Part I.E.4.
310. See supra notes 108, 240 and accompanying text.
311. See supra Part II.A.1.
312. See supra Part II.A.2.
313. See supra Part II.A.3.
314. See supra Part I.B.1.
315. See supra Part II.B.2.
316. See supra notes 224-33 and accompanying text.
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that prosecutors and the agents working under their direction record all
interviews with cooperating witnesses would allow defense counsel full
opportunity to cross-examine the witness with evidence of their prior
inconsistent statements, evidence of their motivation for testifying, and
evidence that their statements may have been a product of their interaction
with the government rather than that of their personal observation. 317 A
recording rule would therefore ensure that juries had the opportunity to
weigh evidence that bears directly on the credibility of cooperating
witnesses and that, currently, in the absence of a recording rule, jurors do
not typically see. Ultimately, juries would be less likely to overvalue
cooperating witness testimony, decreasing the likelihood of wrongful
convictions.
The possible arguments to be made against a recording rule are easily
countered. Although a recording rule could, in many cases, create a large
quantity of discoverable impeachment evidence, there is no reason to
suppose that the rules of evidence would fail to operate correctly in
governing its inclusion or exclusion. 318 Evidentiary rules safeguard trials
from evidence that is irrelevant 319 or excessively prejudicial. 320 Evidence
of a cooperating witness's bias or inconsistent statements, however, always
bears directly on the credibility of that witness, and defense counsel must
have the opportunity to cross-examine cooperating witnesses on any
matters that relate to the witness's credibility. 321 The jury's consideration
of a cooperating witness's credibility is crucial to accurate verdicts. The
jury therefore should have the opportunity to view and weigh all evidence
that relates to a cooperator's credibility, regardless of the quantity. In
addition, where a recording of a cooperator's pretrial interviews produces
evidence that is cumulative or repetitive, the trial judge has the discretion of
excluding such evidence. 322 Given the sound operation of evidentiary rules
and judicial discretion, the jury is not likely to be overly prejudiced by
defense counsel's opportunity to impeach a cooperator with evidence that
has come to light as a result of a recording rule.
In addition, although a recording rule has the potential of alerting
defendants to the cooperator's testimony and motivating some defendants
to threaten, harm, or even kill the cooperator before he testifies, as
Professor Capra has argued, "[a]ny dangers of abuse by [the] defendant-
such as pressuring favorable witnesses-can be controlled by delaying
317. See supra notes 248-57 and accompanying text.
318. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.").
319. See Fed. R. Evid. 402 (stating that "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not
admissible").
320. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
321. See Fed. R. Evid. 611(b) (providing counsel with the right to cross-examine
witnesses about "matters affecting the credibility of the witness").
322. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976) (stating that the trial judge "may
refuse to allow cumulative, repetitive, or irrelevant testimony").
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disclosure on a showing of proof by the prosecutor. '323  Thus, the
prosecution could wait to disclose the cooperator's statements until just
before the trial has begun or, as is the technical rule of the Jencks Act, until
after the witness has testified on direct. 324 In addition, in the event that a
portion of the recorded meeting presented a threat or embarrassment to a
witness or compromised an investigation, 325 courts could "conduct an in
camera inspection of the recording, and preclude the use of any portions
that contain embarrassing or sensitive material. '326
The proposition that a recording rule would chill the free exchange
between prosecutor and cooperator during proffer sessions is also easily
answered: With such inherently suspect witnesses, all lies and
inconsistencies should be exposed. Credible cooperators will be less likely
to make false or inconsistent statements at any point in the proffer sessions,
especially when they know that all their statements will be recorded and
disclosed. To the extent that a recording rule would restrain some
accomplices and snitches from entering into negotiations with the
government, "chilling might be salutary in any event" because of the
"currently 'overheated cooperation market.' "327
The argument that a recording rule could arm a defendant with too much
information, prior to trial, about adverse witness testimony and thus give
that defendant the opportunity to lie more convincingly on the witness stand
is also readily answered. The fear that a defendant may commit perjury
should not overcome the defendant's right to access evidence that could be
favorable to his defense. Further, the "contention that extensive discovery
will promote defendant perjury at trial ignores the presumption of
innocence by assuming that a criminal defendant is guilty and is thus unable
to provide a truthful version of the events when testifying." 328 Even when a
defendant is guilty, he has the opportunity to observe the testimony of the
prosecution's witnesses before he testifies and may thus commit perjury
with or without the extensive discovery that would result from the adoption
of a recording rule.329 Finally, in the event that the cooperator's statements
provide strong evidence of the defendant's guilt, pretrial disclosure of those
statements to the defendant via a recording rule is more likely to induce the
323. Capra, supra note 43, at 427.
324. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000); Fed. R. Crim. 26.2.
325. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics,
55 Vand. L. Rev. 381, 442 (2002); see also Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 681-82
(1957) (Clark, J., dissenting) (opining that, in the event of broadened prosecutorial discovery
requirements, "intelligence agencies of our Government engaged in law enforcement may as
well close up shop, for the Court has opened their files to the criminal and thus afforded him
a Roman holiday for rummaging through confidential information as well as vital national
secrets"); Brennan, supra note 257, at 6 (discussing rejection by Congress of a 1974
proposal to amend Rule 16 of the Federal Rules to require the prosecution to disclose pretrial
witness lists).
326. Witness Coaching, supra note 22, at 862.
327. Harris, supra note 23, at 67 (quoting Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for
Snitches, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 563, 564 (1999)).
328. Marks et al., N.Y. Pretrial Criminal Procedure § 7.1, at 407 (2002).
329. See id.
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defendant to plead guilty than to concoct lies to counter the incriminating
testimony. 330
The last argument to be martialed against the adoption of a recording
rule-that the rule could very easily be disobeyed-also does not have
much force. There is no reason to believe that prosecutors would be
especially likely to disobey a rule of professional conduct requiring them to
record their interviews with cooperators. Many commentators believe that
prosecutors seek guidance from the ethical codes, 331 that most prosecutors
wish to act lawfully and ethically, and that, therefore, most prosecutors will
follow an ethical directive codified in the Model Rules and the state bar
rules.332 Moreover, there are few rules that a prosecutor cannot disobey or
evade if they wish to do so. 333  As one writer has remarked, "Any
procedural requirements are, of course, subject to attempts at evasion and
disputes over compliance." 334 A prosecutor's mere capacity to bypass a
rule in no way militates against its adoption.
Although the recording rule could be adopted as a rule of criminal
procedure, this Note proposes that the rule be promulgated as a rule of
professional conduct, because the concerns that arise in relation to
prosecutors' development and use of cooperating witness testimony have a
predominantly ethical flavor.335 Currently, prosecutors act with nearly
unfettered discretion in selecting and shaping cooperating witness
testimony and in making disclosure decisions that relate to that process. As
one legal writer has remarked, "[T]he integrity of the process of obtaining
cooperating witness testimony is directly tied to the very same ethical rules
which have governed attorney conduct since the adoption of ethical rules in
this country."336  The "core issue of the ethical limits of prosecuting
attorneys' conduct should be addressed in the forum which is best equipped
to deal with it"337-through ethical rules. In exercising discretion outside
the courtroom-where prosecutors are free from any meaningful
330. See Aaron, supra note 71, at 3007 (discussing how broad discovery results in
defendants making informed pleas, an important objective of the criminal justice system).
331. See Green, supra note 259, at 616-17.
332. See, e.g., Roberta K. Flowers, A Code Of Their Own: Updating The Ethics Codes to
Include the Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 923, 965 (1996)
("Specific provisions that address the issues facing prosecuting attorneys would serve to
reinforce the resolve in most prosecutors to do the right thing."); Zacharias, supra note 260,
at 107 ("Unethical lawyers always will ignore the codes when the codes conflict with their
self-interest; scrupulous attorneys will try to follow the codes' commands."); Kurcias, supra
note 73, at 1229 ("There is every reason to believe that the majority of prosecutors would
follow the ethical guidelines.").
333. See, e.g., Weeks, supra note 89, at 835 (observing that "there is almost nothing that
presently prevents the prosecutor disposed to do so from routinely withholding exculpatory
evidence").
334. Harris, supra note 23, at 67.
335. See Cassidy, supra note 33, at 1169 ("The Rules of Professional Conduct are an
appropriate vehicle for capturing a prosecutor's disclosure obligations with respect to
cooperating witnesses.").
336. Ross, supra note 34, at 892.
337. Id. at 877.
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oversight-the prosecutor must act according to his "internal compass."338
The recording rule, which restricts the movement of the needle of that
"internal compass," operates primarily as a rule of professional conduct.
CONCLUSION
A rule of conduct requiring prosecutors and the agents working under
their direction to record all interviews with cooperating witnesses would
enable juries to assess the credibility of inherently suspect cooperating
witnesses with greater accuracy, helping to prevent the conviction of the
innocent. The rule would comport with the notion that prosecutors should
act as "ministers of justice," who must work not only to convict the guilty,
but to guard against conviction of the innocent. The rule would encourage
prosecutors to behave with greater caution in their interactions with
cooperators. And the rule would give an appearance of propriety to
prosecutorial interactions with dubious government witnesses.
338. Flowers, supra note 282, at 739 ("[O]utside the courtroom, e.g., in the police station,
or the witness interview room, the prosecutor must conduct herself professionally by relying
on her own internal compass.").
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